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According to retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, judicial independence is
threatened now more so than any other time throughout history.  Attacks on the judi-
ciary have crossed the line from legitimate criticism to partisan harangues that
threaten the ability of judges to rule fairly and without bias.  This Article begins with
a historical look at judicial independence as it has shaped the Supreme Court,
including the impeachment of Samuel Chase, Ex Parte McCardle and the court-pack-
ing plan and concludes with a call for reform to the judicial appointment process to
permit greater transparency in judicial selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The bruising war between political parties over judicial nominations has
dominated newspapers, with headlines screaming of the use of the “nuclear
option” in the Senate to eliminate judicial filibusters.1  Arguably, the tenor of
the conversation over judicial independence has worsened.  While this tone is
bad, review of the historical incidents of interbranch tension affecting the judi-
ciary is instructive.  This Article theorizes that the root cause of attacks on the
judiciary is a lack of transparency in the appointment process.  This lack of
transparency transforms federal judicial appointment into an inherently political
exercise.  While federal judicial candidates are therefore placed in the impossi-
ble situation of being politically connected to receive their appointments,
almost immediately after appointment, they are sworn to political indepen-
dence.2  This Article examines the three seminal historical events that posed the
* Associate Professor, University of Dayton.
1 See Carolyn Lochhead, Showdown in Senate on Judicial Filibusters, S.F. CHRON., May
18, 2005, at A1 (reporting on attempts by Senate Republicans, then a majority in the Senate,
to change Senate rules to prohibit filibustering on judicial appointments, the so-called
“nuclear option”).  In the spring of 2005, political battles over U.S. judicial appointments
captivated news headlines both at home and abroad. See, e.g., Geoff Elliott, Now or Never
for Bush Judges, AUSTRALIAN, May 16, 2005, at 12; Roger Mitton, Parties on a Warpath
Over US Judges Issue, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May 17, 2005.  Senator John McCain’s
role in a bipartisan group of Senators who blocked the rule change is cited “as one reason for
lingering distrust of him among many conservatives.”  Carl Hulse, Conservative Distrust of
McCain Lingers Over ’05 Deal on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at A1.
2 This Article’s scope is limited to the federal judiciary.  Similar problems exist at the state
level, of course, and are compounded in the thirty-nine states where judges run for direct
election. See Editorial, The Best Judges Business Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at
A18 (pointing out judicial candidates for a state’s highest court raised $47 million nation-
wide in 2004, mostly from business interests).
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greatest threats to the judiciary (the Samuel Chase impeachment, Ex Parte
McCardle,3 and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing plan) to
demonstrate that each time, either the legislative or executive branches attacked
the judiciary out of a sense of frustration that the judges were not being impar-
tial or fair, and that this frustration can be eased if the process of appointment is
more transparent.  Finally, this Article suggests reforms, in line with the consti-
tutional scheme, to satisfy the imperative for a fair, unbiased and impartial judi-
ciary that enjoys a lasting reputation.  Reforms in the United Kingdom
culminating in the 2005 Constitutional Reform Act4 can serve as a useful tem-
plate on how to implement a transparent and independent judicial selection pro-
cess.  Specifically, the United States should examine a statutory duty upon all
government officials to uphold and defend judicial independence, and the crea-
tion of an independent judicial appointment body to make transparent recom-
mendations, based purely on merit, to the President for appointment.
II. THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF MAKING JUDGES
The oversized doors leading to the nation’s Supreme Court are only visi-
ble when the building is closed to the public.  The bronze doors, weighing
thirteen tons and standing seventeen feet tall, hold “four low-relief panels
whose theme illustrates significant events in the evolution of justice in the
Western tradition.”5  The panel on the right door, just underneath the top panel,
is titled “Coke and James I.”6  It depicts “England’s Lord Chief Justice Coke
bar[ring] King James I from the ‘King’s Court,’ making the court, by law,
independent of the executive branch of government.”7
Coke wrote the original charter for Virginia in 16068 and authored Dr.
Bonham’s Case,9 which many historians view as the origins of the doctrine of
judicial review.10  Although originally coined by medieval English jurist Henry
Bracton, Coke is famously attributed to have said, “[t]he king himself should be
under no man, but under God and under the law, wherefore the law makes the
king. . . . There is no king where will dominates and not law.”11  In spite of the
more than 400 years that have passed since Coke proposed a clear separation of
the judiciary function from the executive function, the proper level of indepen-
dence to be accorded to judges remains very much in the national conversation.
3 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
4 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c.4, § 3(5) (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050004_en_3.
5 OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., THE BRONZE DOORS:  INFORMA-




8 Ex parte Indian Ass’n of Alberta & Others, 78 I.L.R. 421, 425 (Eng. Ct. of App. 1982). 
9 Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.).
10 ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAW:  THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT HAVE SHAPED
OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 71-73 (1996).
11 GEORGE HOLMES, THE LATER MIDDLE AGES, 1272-1485, at 80 (1966).
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Judges, of course, are not above criticism.  Lawmakers, academics, the
press, and yes, sometimes even fellow judges,12 routinely comment on and crit-
icize judicial decisions.  They are protected by a constitutional bar against any
reduction in salary, serve for life, and are protected by judicial immunity.13
These mechanisms are designed in the constitutional scheme to protect their
independence while still allowing members of the public, as well as other
branches of government, to criticize them.  Drawing the line between criticism
and attacks, that on balance harm the constitutional scheme, is never an easy
task.  It is made all the more difficult by the political environment, which in
recent times has been shrill.
Take, for example, comments such as the one made by Texas Senator John
Cornyn that judicial activism inflames the public and may lead to violence
against judges, such as the murders of Judge Joan Lefkow’s family members.14
Fellow Texas Republican Tom DeLay’s call for impeachment of judges follow-
ing the debacle over the Terri Schiavo15 case added flames to the fire, as did
James Dobson’s comparison of federal judges to the Ku Klux Klan,16 and Pat
Robertson’s broad assertion that judges presented more of a danger to America
than the Civil War, Nazis, or “bearded terrorists who fly into buildings.”17  The
attacks have been so numerous and vitriolic that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
has made the issue a top priority in her retirement, observing that “I think we’re
hearing more criticisms about judges than I’ve heard in my very long life-
time.”18  Rather than retreat, both Senator DeLay and Senator Cornyn defended
their actions, with Senator Cornyn calling Justice O’Connor’s remarks “hyper-
bole,” while Senator DeLay suggested Justice O’Connor was “rusty on the con-
12 This last category of judges criticizing each other appears to be garnering more media
attention recently. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Unfettered Debate Takes Unflattering Turn in
Michigan Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A21 (reporting on unflattering and
embarrassing behavior by Justices on the Michigan Supreme Court); Tommy Witherspoon,
Disorder in the Court:  Rancor, Dissension Plague Waco’s 10th Court of Appeals, WACO
TRIB.-HERALD, June 10, 2007, at 1A, available at https://www.wacotrib.com/news/content/
news/stories/2007/06/10/06102007wacjumbledjustice.html (observing that Chief Justice
Tom Gray has used the terms “schizophrenic,” “irrational,” and “unlawful” in written dis-
sents to describe his colleagues, and noting that the feuding judges may be motivated by
Republican and Democratic politics).  In one extraordinary instance, a federal judge even
wrote an open letter to incoming Justice Clarence Thomas, expressing skepticism of Justice
Thomas’ upcoming tenure at the Court. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to
Justice Clarence Thomas From a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005
(1992).
13 U.S. CONST, art. III, § 1.
14 See John Aravosis, Breaking:  GOP Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) Says Violence Against
Judges is Understandable, AMERICABLOG.COM, Apr. 4, 2005, http://americablog.blogspot.
com/2005/04/breaking-gop-senator-john-cornyn-r-tx.html.
15 See Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to ‘Political’ Decisions, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 2005, at A7.
16 James Dobson Compared Supreme Court Justices to the KKK, MEDIA MATTERS FOR
AM., Apr. 11, 2005, http://mediamatters.org/items/200504110005.
17 Dale Eisman, “Out of Control” Federal Judges Endanger U.S., Robertson Says, VIRGIN-
IAN-PILOT, May 2, 2005, at A1.
18 Jeff Carlton, O’Connor Says She’s Concerned About Attacks on Judges, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Apr. 5, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/APStories/
stories/D8OA4A300.html. See also Pat Milhizer, Animosity Toward Courts ‘Very Troub-
ling,’ O’Connor Says, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 11, 2007, at 1.
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cept of checks and balances.”19  The attacks are often aimed at judges in
general, but are sometimes narrowly targeted, such as attacks on Justice
Anthony Kennedy,20 for citing international norms in an opinion,21 and to Dis-
trict Judge John Jones,22 for ruling against teaching intelligent design in public
schools.23  Although largely a tactic used by conservatives to attack so-called
activist judges, the political left is not unknown to attack judges, as witnessed
recently in the condemnation24 of a judicial decision to overturn the District of
Columbia’s gun ban.25
In addition to this “high-pitched rhetoric,”26 attacks have also come in the
form of proposed legislation against the judiciary.  A well-publicized voter ini-
tiative, (it garnered 34,000 votes to appear on the November 2006 ballot),
“JAIL for Judges,”27 which would have stripped judges of judicial immunity,
failed in South Dakota but only after a concerted effort by members of the bar
to educate the public.28  Similarly, congressional efforts to prohibit the
Supreme Court from citing foreign law,29 or to strip federal courts from hearing
cases involving religious expression, have thus far failed.30
Far more successful, however, was legislation to introduce an Inspector
General for the judiciary,31 an effort that resulted in a massive campaign by the
19 Todd J. Gillman, Texas Legislators Take Issue with O’Connor’s Warnings, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 19, 2006, at 10A.
20 Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy is:  Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9,
2005, at A3 (reporting on a conference held by the Judeo-Christian Council for Constitu-
tional Restoration, at which noted conservative Phyllis Schlafly said Justice Kennedy had
not met the Constitution’s requirement for “good behavior” and called for his impeachment).
21 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The opinion of the world com-
munity, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirma-
tion for our own conclusions.”).
22 See Phyllis Schlafly, Judge’s Unintelligent Rant Against Design, EAGLE F., Jan. 6, 2006,
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2006/jan06/06-01-04.html (accusing Judge Jones “stuck
the knife in the backs” of conservatives).
23 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
24 See Jesse Jackson, Activist Judge Takes Aim at Gun Law, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 13,
2007, at 23.
25 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
26 Judicial Security and Independence:  Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm).
27 See Ron Branson, Post-Election Report, SD-JAIL4JUDGES.ORG, http://www.sd-
jail4judges.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2008).
28 Bert Brandenburg, Rushmore to Judgment, SLATE, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.slate.com/
id/2138057/.
29 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003).  For Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
response to Congressional efforts to restrict the Supreme Court from citing foreign law, see
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind:”  The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html.
30 See, e.g., We the People Act, H.R. 300, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).  For an expanded discus-
sion of these efforts, see Am. Bar Ass’n, Independence of the Judiciary:  Court Stripping and
Erosion of Judicial Discretion, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/erode/ (last visited
Sept. 14, 2008).
31 Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5219, 109th Cong. § 2
(2006); Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 785, 110th Cong.
§ 2 (2007).
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judiciary to scuttle the bill before it could be voted on.32  In addition to legisla-
tion affecting the structure of the judiciary, highly politicized cases surrounding
issues such as gay marriage, abortion, executive power and civil rights may be
leading to a “new era of congressional sensitivity to court decisions that can be
remedied with legislation.”33
The upshot of this public spotlight on the judiciary is that presidential
appointments to the bench are now examined with exacting scrutiny.  A recent
Wall Street Journal editorial, for example, proudly crowed that although Presi-
dent George Bush had confirmed fewer federal appellate judges than Presidents
William Clinton or Ronald Reagan, he has paid “rigorous attention to judicial
philosophy (no Souters here!).”34  In discussing the upcoming presidential elec-
tion, the editorial warns the Republican contenders that judicial nominations
matter, and that “Mr. Bush set a high bar for what the base expects from its
leaders; that alone is a legacy.”35  The political ideologies of President Bush’s
Supreme Court nominees were vetted by a committee led by Vice President
Richard Cheney in an “unprecedented” examination.36  Even Justice Antonin
Scalia, a President Reagan appointee confirmed ninety-eight to zero by the Sen-
ate, freely admits that he “wouldn’t get 60 votes today.”37  Once appointed, an
inordinate amount of time and energy is expended to parse judicial opinions to
divine whether a judge is conservative or liberal, activist or restrained, solid or
drifting.38
The rhetoric has been fueled in large part by a perception that judges are
results-oriented and seek results that comport generally with liberal or con-
servative positions.39  That perception is validated by empirical research dem-
onstrating fairly conclusively that “[t]o a substantial degree, the ideological
tendencies of courts of appeals are correlated with the percentages of appoin-
tees by Republican and Democratic presidents.”40  A recent study of voting
patterns of judges in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals revealed that those
judges “consistently voted along partisan lines,” even in cases involving habeas
appeals and capital punishment.41  Professor Anthony Champagne believes the
32 House Bill Would Impose Inspector General on Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, July 2006,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/07-06/bill/index.html.
33 Elana Schor, Legislators Consider Fixes to Supreme Court Rulings, HILL, June 27, 2007,
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/legislators-consider-fixes-to-supreme-court-rulings-
2007-06-27.html.
34 Kimberley A. Strassel, Op-Ed., Judging the Bush Legacy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2007, at
A10.
35 Id.
36 Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Taking on the Supreme Court Case, WASH. POST, June 26,
2007, at A10.
37 Chris Tisch, Scalia at Stetson Praises Original Intent View of Constitution, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at 4B.
38 See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, The Drifters, TIME, Apr. 16, 2007, at 57 (summarizing
results of research studying ideological “drift” in federal judges over time).
39 See Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies:  Some Decisions Are All the Rage – Literally,
91 A.B.A. J. 38, 42 (2005).
40 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 129 (2006).
41 Dan Horn, The Politics of Life and Death:  An Inmate’s Fate Often Hinges on Luck of the
Draw, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 15, 2007, at A1 (reporting that “[a] panel with a liberal
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attacks against judges increased substantially with the judiciary’s interest in
civil liberties questions during the Warren court era.42
The debate appears where a judiciary crosses the line from vigorously
enforcing checks and balances on the other two branches of government to the
lawless prairies of policymaking.43  In this debate, “judicial activism” has
become a universal pejorative.44  Prominent conservative academics cry that
the Supreme Court “sits in final judgment of essentially all policy issues, disre-
garding its constitutional limitations, the legitimate roles of Congress and the
president, and the broad authority conferred upon the states and the people”45
and that the Supreme Court operates as a quasi-legislature, and is poor at it.46
This common refrain is heard in spite of empirical evidence indicating that
Justice Scalia is the most “activist” Justice on the Supreme Court.47
Confirmation hearings take on a circus-like atmosphere, and when judges
are nominated with prior executive branch experience, their work (sometimes
decades old) as advocates become grist for the confirmation mill.48  Professor
Cass Sunstein points out that the claim that judges should interpret the law is
both correct and “ludicrously unhelpful” since “interpreting the law” is itself
subject to interpretation.49  In reality, “[w]hat critics on both left and right
really object to is the neutral application of constitutional principles when it
hampers their own desired policy outcomes.”50
majority gives the inmate a far greater chance of avoiding execution than one with a con-
servative majority”).
42 See Anthony Champagne, The Politics of Criticizing Judges, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 839,
841 (2006).
43 For a vigorous discussion on this “line” for judicial activism, see Video and audio:  Book
Forum on DAVID’S HAMMER:  THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY held by The CATO
Institute (Apr. 3, 2007), available at http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=3552 (forum
featured Clint Bolick, M. Edward Whelan III & Jeffrey Rosen).
44 Id.
45 MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK:  HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA
12 (2005).
46 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?:  The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 993-94 (2000).
47 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Verdict on the Supremes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2007, at A21.
48 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic & Toni Locy, Documents Offer Insight into Roberts’ Work in
’80s, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005, at 5A (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts wrote memos
reminding the attorney general that Reagan’s conservative supporters expected appointments
of judges who respected “traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life”);
Richard L. Hasen, Roberts’ Iffy Support for Voting Rights, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at B13
(discussing that Chief Justice Roberts urged Attorney General William French Smith to take
an “aggressive stance” in opposing legislation to strengthen minority voting rights); Toni
Locy & Kevin Johnson, Roberts’ Documents Disclose Little About Nominee, USA TODAY,
July 27, 2005, at 4A (reporting on scrutiny over Chief Justice Roberts’ memos from his days
as a special assistant to Attorney General William French Smith); David E. Rosenbaum,
Robert Pear, Jonathan Glater & Glen Justice, Files from 80’s Lay Out Stances of Bush Nomi-
nee, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A1 (reporting on many of Chief Justice Roberts’s legal
memoranda from his work as special assistant to Attorney General William French Smith).
49 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:  WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 23 (2005).
50 Clint Bolick, A Cheer for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A15.
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The response to this latest round of attacks on the judiciary has been
muted at best.  Seventy-five percent of the deans of United States law schools
signed a statement to members of Congress opposing threats of retaliation
against federal judges for decisions made on the bench.51  Several successful
drives were launched to drive back much-hated legislation, but these were reac-
tionary in nature.  Justice O’Connor continues to press the topic as one of tre-
mendous importance, launching an initiative through Georgetown Law to study
the problem.52  Congressional action has been limited to legislation to provide
home security systems for judges who request them.53  Real reform remains
elusive.
Placed in historical context, however, contemporary attacks on the judici-
ary are neither particularly frequent nor notably vehement.  Indeed, the history
of the federal courts itself begins with attacks on the judiciary being launched
while the ink on the Constitution was barely drying.54  The institutional jeal-
ousies that lead to these attacks have much to teach us, for they contextualize
what we are experiencing and point the way to meaningful and long-term
reform rather than short term measures that doom us to repeat history’s mis-
takes yet again.  In the next section, this Article explores some of these seminal
moments in judicial history and what some of those lessons may be.
III. THE CHASE IMPEACHMENT
By most accounts, Justice Samuel Chase was an able lawyer and judge, a
good thinker and fiercely loyal to his friends.55  However, he was also a “man
of violent opinions, over-bearing manners, and fierce temper, he made enemies
rapidly and easily, and he was always a center of controversy . . . .”56  Histori-
ans note that history tends to overlook Justice Chase because of an “obsession
with the superficial oddities of the man, his overbearing nature with lawyers
and with juries, his apparently distasteful bombastic style, his unwillingness to
suffer fools . . . .”57  He was a Justice who “stubbornly pushed his judicial
career to the brink of disaster and yet averted disgrace . . . .”58
51 Press Release, N. Y. Univ., Law Schools’ Deans Challenge Congressional Attack on the
Judiciary (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.nyu.edu/public.affairs/releases/detail/647.
52 See Greg Langlois & Anne Cassidy, Georgetown Univ., Fair and Independent Courts:  A
Conference on the State of the Judiciary, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/events/
conference_story.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
53 Jeff Coen, Judges Get Home Security, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2006, at C1.
54 See, e.g., infra Section III.
55 See, e.g., R.W. Carrington, The Impeachment Trial of Samuel Chase, 9 VA. L. REV. 485,
485 (1923) (quoting Senator Beveridge, who described Chase as “intensely patriotic, coura-
geous, able, learned, and of unquestionable integrity, both in his judicial and personal
capacity”).
56 GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:  JOHN MAR-
SHALL 1801–1815, at 91 (1981) (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 26
(Vintage Books 2002) (1987)).
57 STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING:  THE ENGLISH, THE AMERI-
CANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 179 (1991).
58 Jerry W. Knudson, The Jeffersonian Assault on the Federalist Judiciary, 1802-1805;
Political Forces and Press Reaction, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 55, 62 (1970).
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The impeachment of Justice Chase is often cited as an example of the first
time a Supreme Court Justice was impeached and the last time a Justice was
impeached solely for his judicial acts or decisions.59  The story of Justice
Chase’s impeachment illustrates the nature of interbranch dynamics when the
legislative branch takes aim at a judiciary seen as lawless and illegitimate, as
was the case after the Jeffersonian revolution of 1800.
A. Impeachment
Under the Constitution, the President, Vice-President, and all “civil
officers” of the United States may be impeached.60  These individuals may be
removed from office upon conviction for treason, bribery or other high crimes
and misdemeanors.61  Federal judges are provided with lifetime tenure “during
good behavior,”62 implying Congress may remove a judge for bad behavior.
Impeachment of judges follows the same procedure as impeachment for other
branches:  the House of Representatives passes articles of impeachment by a
simple majority63 and the Senate tries the accused.64  A vote of two-thirds of
the Senators present is required to convict the defendant, which automatically
results in the defendant’s removal from office.65  Presidential pardons are pro-
hibited in impeachments66 and the right to trial by jury does not extend to
impeachments.67  The House has initiated sixty-two impeachment proceedings
since 1789, resulting in the impeachment of two Presidents (President Andrew
Johnson and President Clinton, both acquitted), one cabinet officer (William
Belknap, Secretary of War, resigned and later acquitted), one Senator (Senator
William Blount, expelled, charges dismissed), one Supreme Court Justice (Jus-
tice Samuel Chase, acquitted), and twelve other federal judges (most recently
Judge Walter Nixon, convicted on November 3, 1989).68  All seven Senate
convictions in impeachment proceedings have been federal judges.69
B. Early Life
Samuel Chase was born on April 17, 1741, in Princess Anne, Somerset
County, Maryland.70  His father was Rev. Thomas Chase, an Episcopalian pas-
59 See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts:  Impeachments of Fed-
eral Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/topics_ji_bdy (last visited Sept. 14,
2008).
60 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
61 Id.
62 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
63 Am. Bar Ass’n, Impeachment Resources:  A Look at the Impeachment Process, http://
www.abanet.org/publiced/impeach2.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
65 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
68 U.S. Senate, Impeachment, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brief-
ing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).
69 Id.
70 ColonialHall.com, Samuel Chase:  1743-1811, http://www.colonialhall.com/chase/chase.
php (last visited Sept. 3, 2008) (citing CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE SIGNERS TO THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 338-46 (1856)).
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tor.71  His mother died during his birth, and his family was somewhat impover-
ished, which may explain Chase’s “tendency easily to take offense and his
predilection for speculative schemes as a result of a deep need to feel himself
the equal of the members of the Maryland upper classes by whom he was
slighted in his youth.”72  Some historians have suggested that the death of his
mother explains his “lack of social graces and tact.”73  In 1743 the elder Chase
was appointed to St. Paul’s Church in Baltimore and moved the family there.74
Rev. Chase taught Samuel at home, which at that time gave Samuel an advan-
tage over his contemporaries, as the quality of public education was quite
poor.75  At age eighteen, he moved to Annapolis where he began studying
law.76  He was admitted to the bar at age twenty.77  He began his political
career in 1764 (age twenty-four), as a member of the General Assembly of
Maryland and served there for twenty years.78
C. An Early Patriot
Chase was a member of the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1778,
serving as a delegate from Maryland.79  In the spring of 1776 he was part of a
congressional mission to Canada to convince the Canadians to support the
American Confederacy (ultimately, an unsuccessful mission).80  When he
returned to Philadelphia, Congress was debating issuing a declaration of inde-
pendence.81  Delegates from Maryland were prohibited by the appointing con-
vention from voting in favor of a declaration of independence.82  Chase
returned to Maryland and convinced people there to send letters to the conven-
tion in Annapolis.83  After the convention voted unanimously in favor for inde-
pendence, Chase rode back to Philadelphia, covering 150 miles in two days, to
join the vote for independence on the day of his arrival.84  One biographer
wrote that in Congress, Chase:
[P]ossessed, beyond most others, an ardor of mind, which sometimes, in debate, car-
ried him almost beyond the bounds of propriety.  There were some others from time
to time in congress of a similar stamp.  They were important members; they served to
71 Id.
72 Stephen B. Presser, Book Review, 68 J. AM. HIST. 657, 658 (1981) (reviewing JAMES
HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT:  THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE (1980)).
73 See, e.g., id.
74 Samuel Chase:  1743-1811, supra note 70 (citing CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE
SIGNERS TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 338-46 (1856)).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Richard B. Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 51 (1960).
78 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Chase, Samuel, http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000334 (last visited Sept.14, 2008).
79 Samuel Chase:  1743-1811, supra note 70 (citing CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE
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animate that body by the warmth which they manifested in debate, and to rouse the
more supine or timid to action, as the necessity of the times required.85
In 1778, Chase was forced to leave the Continental Congress “under a
cloud after being denounced for using privileged information to speculate in the
flour market.”86
In 1783, forty-three year old Chase went to England to reclaim money
Maryland had entrusted to the Bank of England.87  He spent a year there, mar-
ried his second wife, and brought her back to America.88  Upon his return to
America, he engaged in “various mercantile and land ventures, practiced and
taught law, was a dominant figure in state politics, and emerged as one of the
leading opponents of the adoption of the United States Constitution.”89  His-
torians believe his opposition to the Constitution stemmed from his fear that the
Constitution “would destroy state sovereignty and, therefore, his own political
status” in Maryland.90
Chase became judge of the Baltimore criminal court in 1788 (age forty-
eight), and was appointed chief justice of the general court in Maryland in
1791.91  The period between 1789 and 1793 is relatively undocumented in
Chase’s life, but it is marked by a clear conversion.  In 1789, he was a “dispir-
ited Antifederalist, ending a powerful legislative career and wondering how
liberty could survive in a consolidated government susceptible to aristocratic
influence.”92  By 1790, Chase had become a “stiff-necked Federalist, fearful of
democracy and pessimistic about the future.”93  In 1793, he was “attacking the
press as licentious” and “trembling for the future of religion and social
order.”94  Some historians speculate that Chase was “driven by an outsider’s
hungry desire for acceptance in the inner circle of society, having inherited a
gnawing ambition from his father.”95
Like most Americans at the time, Chase was aghast at the French
Revolution.
The exaltation of atheism, the incitement of jealous violence by the lower orders
against men of stature, the trampling of civil liberties, the assault on property rights,
and the boldly proclaimed goal of ravaging all Europe, perhaps the whole Atlantic
world, with similar savageries–this was what France meant to men like Chase.96
85 Id.
86 Richard E. Ellis, Book Review, 48 J.S. HIST. 101, 102 (1982) (reviewing JAMES HAW ET
AL., STORMY PATRIOT:  THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE (1980)).
87 Samuel Chase:  1743-1811, supra note 70 (citing CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE
SIGNERS TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 338-46 (1856)).
88 Id.
89 Ellis, supra note 86, at 101.
90 See Marvin R. Cain, Book Review, 2 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 198, 199 (1982) (reviewing
JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT:  THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE (1980)).
91 Samuel Chase:  1743-1811, supra note 70 (citing CHARLES A. GOODRICH, LIVES OF THE
SIGNERS TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 338-46 (1856)).
92 James H. Broussard, Book Review, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 162, 162 (1983) (reviewing




96 Id. at 163.
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He saw the Francophiles, affiliated with Jefferson, as deluded, intention-
ally “misleading voters with constant lies in the press” and threatening to end
America’s short experiment with independent democracy.97
D. Supreme Court Appointment
President George Washington nominated Chase as an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States on January 26, 179698 (the Supreme
Court had only existed for six years at that time).  He was confirmed a day later
in the Senate.99  Chase was fifty-five when he became a Supreme Court
Justice.100
In those early years, the Supreme Court was very different than the institu-
tion that exists today.  In 1791, only a year after the Court was organized,
Justice John Rutledge, an original member, “resigned from the Court in order to
become chief justice of his home state, South Carolina.”101  Four years later,
Justice John Jay, the first Chief Justice, “resigned to become Governor of his
home state, New York.”102  In 1800, when President John Adams asked Gover-
nor Jay to return to the Court, Governor Jay declined, observing that the Court
lacked “energy, weight, and dignity.”103  “[D]uring the Supreme Court’s first
decade of operation (1790-1800), five of the first 12 men to serve on the Court
resigned, while three other nominees” declined appointment or promotion to
Chief Justice.104
From an early point in his career, Chase sought a federal judicial appoint-
ment from President Washington.105  In 1788 he declared bankruptcy and the
ghosts of his involvement in flour and land speculation led President Washing-
ton to avoid appointing him.106  His recent opposition to the new Constitution
may have also led President Washington to steer clear of Chase initially.107
After Chase’s appointment as chief judge of the Maryland general court in
1791 and James McHenry’s 1795 report to the President that Chase had con-
verted to Federalism, President Washington agreed to appoint Chase.108  Presi-
dent Washington was also motivated by a very practical need to seat Chase.
On January 28, 1796, President Washington urged Chase to hurry to Philadel-
phia because “‘without him, there is no certainty of a sufficient number of
Judges to constitute’ the Supreme Court.”109
97 Id.
98 Knudson, supra note 58, at 63.
99 Id.
100 Lillich, supra note 77, at 53.
101 Robert S. Barker, I Do Solemnly Swear, EJOURNAL USA:  ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, Apr.




105 W. Wayne Smith, Book Review, 48 J.S. HIST. 280, 281 (1982) (reviewing JANE SHAF-
FER ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE (1980)).
106 Id.
107 James R. Perry, Supreme Court Appointments, 1789-1801:  Criteria, Presidential Style,
and the Press of Events, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 371, 394 (1986).
108 Id. at 394-95.
109 Id.
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At that time, Justice Chase sincerely opposed “what he perceived to be the
pro-French, atheistic, egalitarian Republicans.”110  This distrust of Republicans
would eventually lead to his later impeachment.  He served on the Supreme
Court for five years before John Marshall became Chief Justice.111  Justice
Marshall wrote that Justice Chase “possessed a strong mind, great legal knowl-
edge, and was a valuable judge.”112
E. 1800
The political environment during this time was “partisan to a degree diffi-
cult to appreciate fully today . . . .”113  When Federalist judges issued a deci-
sion, they were seen as creating a “conspiracy to deprive the people of
power.”114  The Federalists saw the judiciary as the sole defender of democracy
against mob rule.115  In this environment, the Justices were “ambivalent mem-
bers of an ambiguous institution.”116  Many of the Justices operated “freely” in
politics and engaged in “far-ranging and free-sweeping commentary.”117  After
Thomas Jefferson won the presidential election in 1800, a Federalist Senator
said:  “We are indeed, fallen on evil times.  The high office of President is
filled by an infidel, that of Vice-President by a murderer.”118  One Jeffersonian
Senator remarked about Federalist judges:
What think you, my friends, of our Supreme Judges electioneering at town and
county meetings, those grave and solemn characters who ought to be retired from the
public eye, who ought never to be seen in numerous assemblies or mingle in their
passions and prejudices, and who, with respect to all political questions and charac-
ters, ought ever to be deaf and blind to everything except what they hear in
evidence?119
The deeply partisan divide over the judiciary was reflected in the numbers:
when President Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, there was not one sin-
gle Republican or Jeffersonian judge sitting in a federal court anywhere in the
country.120  To make matters worse, one of President Adams’s “midnight
appointment” judges (judges nominated after December 12, 1800, when it
110 Cain, supra note 90, at 199.
111 Lillich, supra note 77, at 53.
112 Id.
113 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  The Road
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 358 (1998). See also Carrington, supra note
55, at 498.
It was a time of bitter party feeling.  There were men like Giles of Virginia in the Republican
ranks whose prejudices along party lines were far too bitter to allow him to judicially consider
any Federal personage or doctrine.  The Federal ranks contained equally as bitter partisans.  John
Adams had been arbitrary to a degree, and his ‘mid-night’ appointments, regardless of their
wisdom, manifested a total lack of consideration and fairness on Adam’s part to Jefferson.
Id.
114 Friedman, supra note 113, at 358.
115 Id.
116 Alan F. Westin, Out-of-Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices,
1790-1962:  Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 637 (1962).
117 Id.
118 Carrington, supra note 55, at 498.
119 Westin, supra note 116, at 638.
120 Knudson, supra note 58, at 55.
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became clear from electoral returns that President Adams lost the election) was
John Marshall, a strong Federalist, now settling in for a long tenure at the
Supreme Court.121
During this time, Supreme Court Justices were assigned to travel and hold
court in the congressionally-created judicial circuits and would often charge
grand juries with long speeches about the federal law.122  Between 1798 and
1803, several Federalist judges began to use these grand jury charges as “ham-
mer blows” for the Adams administration.123  For example, in June 1799,
“Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth charged grand juries in South Carolina that
those persons ‘opposing the existence of the National Government or the effi-
cient exercise of its legitimate powers’ should . . . be indicted . . . .”124  During
the 1800 presidential campaign Justice Bushrod Washington stumped for can-
didate Charles C. Pinkney.125  Judges also lectured grand juries on political
questions such as “the Jay Treaty, French revolutionary plots against ‘all relig-
ion . . . and order, . . . American ‘Jacobins’ (i.e., ‘anti-Federalists’) in
fomenting discontent, . . . [and] the great wisdom of the [Adams] administra-
tion . . . .126  President Jefferson remarked that the Justices were engaged in “‘a
perversion of the institution of the grand jury from a legal to a political
engine.’”127
The battle over the judiciary played itself out early in the Jefferson admin-
istration with the repeal of the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801.128  The Act
created sixteen new circuit courts and was characterized much later by Felix
Frankfurter as “thoughtful concern for the federal judiciary with selfish concern
for the Federalist party.”129  The Act addressed long-held concerns by circuit-
riding judges about the primitive modes of transportation and the conflicts
posed by a Justice being called to rule upon a case he decided while he was
riding circuit.130  The repeal of the Judiciary Act was not carried out easily,
with struggles surrounding the constitutional issue of “whether Congress had
the right to abolish as well as to create inferior courts, in view of the injunction
that judges were not to be removed during ‘good behavior.’”131  Alexander
Hamilton delivered a speech declaring that if the Republicans passed the repeal
bill, “the [C]onstitution was but a shadow” and “[b]etween a government of
laws administered by an independent judiciary, or a despotism supported by an
army, there is no medium.  If we relinquish one, we must submit to the
other.”132  Newspapers quickly took sides in the debate, with the National
Intelligencer commenting after the repeal:  “Judges, created for political pur-
121 Id.
122 Westin, supra note 116, at 640.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 640-41.
125 Id. at 637-38.
126 Id. at 641.
127 Id. (quoting 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 165 (rev.
ed. 1947).
128 Knudson, supra note 58, at 55-56. See also Friedman, supra note 113, at 357.
129 Knudson, supra note 58, at 56.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 56-57.
132 Id. at 58 (quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 19, 1802).
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poses, and for the worst of purposes under a republican government, for the
purpose of opposing the national will, from this day cease to exist.”133  Presi-
dent Jefferson himself stated:
It has long been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression, that the
germ of dissolution of our Federal Government is in the constitution of the Federal
judiciary.  An irresponsible body, working like gravity by day and by night, gaining a
little to-day and a little to-morrow, and advancing, with noiseless step like a thief,
over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the state, and the govern-
ment of all become consolidated into one.134
Senator James Breckinridge summed President Jefferson’s viewpoint:
It is said that the different departments of government are to be checks on each other,
and that the courts are to check the [L]egislature.  If this be true, I would ask where
they got that power, and who checks the courts when they violate the Constitution?
Would they not, by this doctrine, have the absolute direction of the government?  To
whom are they responsible?135
The Federalist-leaning New England Palladium, meanwhile, wrote that to
repeal the Judiciary Act “breaks down almost the only barrier against licen-
tiousness and party tyranny . . . .”136  The Federalists believed the easy expres-
sion of people’s passions to the legislature was dangerous.137  They expressed
this belief by advocating strictly for judicial independence.138  Their position
was not successful.  The repeal measure passed by a vote of sixteen to fifteen in
the Senate and fifty-nine to thirty-two in the House of Representatives.139  The
repeal measure also stipulated the Supreme Court would not meet at all during
1802, postponing the Court’s opening until February 1803.140  1802 marked the
last time Congress tinkered with the tenure of existing judges when altering the
court system.141
The most famous of the judicial speeches came from Associate Justice
Samuel Chase in 1803.142  While charging a grand jury in Baltimore, Justice
Chase excoriated the repeal of the Judiciary Act and spoke strongly against
universal male suffrage in a new Maryland constitution.143  On the repeal of the
Judiciary Act, he said:  “The late alteration of the Federal judiciary . . . will in
my judgment take away all security for property and personal liberty.”144  He
added:  “The independence of the national judiciary is already shaken to its
foundation, the virtue of the people alone can restore it. . . . Our republican
Constitution will sink into a mobocracy, the worst of all possible govern-
133 Id. (quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 5, 1802).
134 Alexander Pope Humphrey, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 5 VA. L. REG. 281, 299
(1899).
135 Friedman, supra note 113, at 363.
136 Knudson, supra note 58, at 58 (quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 12,
1802) (citation omitted).
137 Friedman, supra note 113, at 360-61
138 Id. at 361.
139 Knudson, supra note 58, at 57.
140 Id. at 61.
141 Id. at 57.
142 Westin, supra note 116, at 641.
143 Id.
144 Knudson, supra note 58, at 63 (quoting 2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 243 (1889))
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ments.”145  Justice Chase could not resist also attacking President Jefferson’s
administration as “weak, relaxed and not adequate to a discharge of their func-
tions.”146  Republicans, Justice Chase said, wanted to continue exercising an
“unfairly acquired power.”147  A newspaper, the National Intelligencer, con-
demned Justice Chase’s speech as “the most extraordinary that the violence of
federalism has yet produced, and exhibits humiliating evidence of the unfortu-
nate effects of disappointed ambition.”148  Upon hearing of Justice Chase’s
speech, President Jefferson wrote to two leading House Republicans, Joseph
Nicholson and John Randolph (later the House manager of Justice Chase’s
impeachment):
Ought this seditious and official attack on the principles of our Constitution and on
the proceedings of a State go unpunished; and to whom so pointedly as yourself will
the public look for the necessary measures?  I ask these questions for your considera-
tion; for myself, it is better that I should not interfere.149
F. The Impeachment
The Republican view reflected a belief that impeachment was a “means of
keeping the men on the bench in line with the will of the people by removing
those judges whose opinions did not reflect those of more than one-third of the
Senate.”150  Senator Giles, President Jefferson’s fellow Virginian and a Repub-
lican Senate leader, held the view besides Justice Chase, all other Judges should
be impeached and removed.151  He felt there was no constitutional basis for
judicial independence and Judges’ “pretensions to [independence] were nothing
more nor less than an attempt to establish an aristocratic despotism in them-
selves.”152  Some historians have suggested that President Jefferson was so
irked by Marbury v. Madison153 that he would have tried to impeach Chief
Justice Marshall had the experiment with Justice Chase succeeded.154  It was
rumored that President Jefferson even had a replacement in mind as Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s successor, Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia.155  At the state
level, Federalist judges were already being impeached, including the 1802
impeachment of Judge Addison, the presiding judge of the Common Pleas
145 Id.
146 Westin, supra note 116, at 641.
147 Id. at 641-42.
148 Knudson, supra note 58, at 67 (quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 20,
1803).
149 Lillich, supra note 77, at 51 (quoting 2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
50 (1889)).
150 Id. at 55-56 (citing ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL III 159 (1916-
19)).
151 Id. at 56.
152 Id.
153 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
154 See, e.g., Lillich, supra note 77, at 57 (quoting ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL III 160 (1916-19)). See also Carrington, supra note 55, at 498.
155 Knudson, supra note 58, at 74.
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Court of Pennsylvania.156  After his conviction, the entire Supreme Bench of
Pennsylvania was impeached, but later acquitted after support from the bar.157
Emboldened by their repeal of the Judiciary Act, Republicans had begun
to “cast around for a likely Federalist judge” to attempt impeachment.158  They
began with Judge John Pickering, District Judge of New Hampshire, who
according to informants regularly appeared on the bench drunk and engaged in
profanity.159  By a vote of forty-five to eight, the House impeached Judge Pick-
ering on March 3, 1803.160  That same year, Chief Justice Marshall handed
down Marbury v. Madison,161 a decision that is recognized today as the estab-
lishing the rule of law in courts.162
Judge Pickering’s Senate trial began on March 2, 1804 and Judge Picker-
ing failed to make an appearance.163  His son Jacob, however, appeared and
told the Senators his father had been insane for two years before the alleged
offenses and was still insane.164  The Republicans were in a quandary, because
while they wanted to remove an insane judge, the fact of his insanity “pre-
cluded his being convicted of willful ‘high crimes or misdemeanors.’”165  The
Senators were therefore asked to vote on whether Judge Pickering was “guilty
‘as charged.’”166  Of the thirty-four Senators, only twenty-six voted and con-
victed Judge Pickering on a vote of nineteen to seven.167
Exactly one hour after the conviction of Judge Pickering, the House, with-
out debate, voted the impeachment of Justice Chase along party lines, seventy-
three to thirty-two.168  While Justice Chase was pending trial, Chief Justice
Marshall privately proposed that Congress be granted authority to overrule
judicial decisions on constitutional questions.169  One of his biographers attrib-
uted this suggestion to Chief Justice Marshall’s fear of Justice Chase’s
impeachment proceedings.170  The party lineup in the Senate was twenty-five
Republicans and nine Federalists.171  If the vote went along party lines, the
Republicans could obtain two-thirds majority required to convict.
156 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 290.
157 Id. at 291.
158 Knudson, supra note 58, at 61.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
162 For an extended and excellent discussion of Marbury, see Louise Weinberg, Our Mar-
bury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2003).  In the case, Chief Justice Marshall made it clear that
[W]hether or not demagogues hold the political branches, and whether or not public opinion is
mob opinion, the courts are open; that a tough, independent judiciary will guard its indepen-
dence; that American courts will say what the Constitution requires of the legislature, of our
officers, and of the judges as well.
Id. at 1411.





168 Id. at 62.
169 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS:  THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 126 (1992).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 108.
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The articles of impeachment alleged that Justice Chase had been less than
impartial when presiding at trials and when supervising grand jury investiga-
tions in a series of cases against political opponents of the Adams administra-
tion.172  They also alleged that in 1803 he had delivered an “intemperate and
inflammatory political harangue” to a grand jury in Maryland against the state
government.173  The three most important charges concerned Justice Chase’s
handling of the treason trial of John Fries, the sedition trial of James Callender,
and his 1803 speech in Baltimore.174  Another article, the fifth, charged Justice
Chase with “[m]isconduct at the [Callender] trial in issuing a bench warrant
instead of a summons.”175  This article made “mere error of judgment impeach-
able.”176  Since the article “could have been applied to the entire Supreme
Court, conviction of Justice Chase on this count would have put the court at the
mercy of Congress.”177  In his book, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist
believed that the case against Justice Chase was “not devoid of substance.”178
In particular, the trial of James Callender raised serious questions.179
James Callender was no stranger to controversy.  In 1793, he was indicted
in Britain “for seditious criticism of the government [and] fled to the United
States.”180  He became a “pronounced partisan” for the Republicans and
attacked the Federalists in pamphlets and in newspaper pages.181  “To avoid the
Alien Law, he . . . naturalized [as a U.S.] citizen.”182  Callender wrote an elec-
tion pamphlet, The Prospect Before Us,183 in Virginia in 1800, campaigning
for Jefferson.184  Some of what Callender wrote is worth excerpting:
The reign of Mr. Adams has been one continued tempest of malignant passions.  As
President, he has never opened his lips, or lifted his pen without threatening and
scolding . . . . The object of Mr. Adams was to recommend a French war, professedly
for the sake of supporting American commerce, but in reality for the sake of yoking
us into an alliance with the British tyrant.
. . . Adams [is] a “hoary headed incendiary” . . . “You will then make your
choice between paradise and perdition; you will choose between the man who has
deserted and reversed all his principles, and that man whose own example strength-
ens all his laws, that man whose predictions, like those of Henry, have been con-
verted into history.  You will choose between that man whose life is unspotted by
crime, and that man whose hands are reeking with the blood of the poor, friendless
Connecticut sailor:  I see the tear of indignation starting on your cheeks!  You antici-
172 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1237-40 (1804).
173 Id. at 1239.
174 Knudson, supra note 58, at 63. See also Carrington, supra note 55, at 487 (noting that
“there were really only three charges of importance”).
175 Lillich, supra note 77, at 59.
176 Id. at 60.
177 Id.
178 REHNQUIST, supra note 169, at 108.
179 James Haw, Book Review, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 402, 403 (1993) (reviewing REHN-
QUIST, supra note 169).
180 James Morton Smith, Sedition in the Old Dominion:  James T. Callender and the Pros-
pect Before Us, 20 J.S. HIST. 157, 158 (1954).
181 Id. at 158-59.
182 Id. at 159 (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 7, 1798),
reprinted in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 267 (Paul L. Ford, ed. 1892-99)
183 JAMES THOMSON CALLENDER, THE PROSPECT BEFORE US (1800).
184 Smith, supra note 180, at 161 & n.18, 162.
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pate the name of John Adams.”  “Take your choice then, between Adams, war and
beggary, and Jefferson, peace and competency.”185
On the judiciary, Callender wrote:  “If Washington wanted to corrupt the
American judges, he could not have taken a more decisive step than by the
appointment of [Chief Justice] Jay.”186  Callender’s work gained in popularity
and was soon being distributed throughout the country, including Philadel-
phia.187  The Federalists tried to ban the sale of his pamphlet there, to which
Callender replied:  “If the author has afforded room for an action, do prosecute
him.  But do not take such pitiful behind the door measures in order to stop the
circulation of truth.”188
Justice Chase was quick to accept Callender’s invitation.  By the time he
was already on the Supreme Court, Justice Chase felt that “a licentious press is
the bane of freedom, and the peril of Society.”189  After reading The Prospect
Before Us,190 Justice Chase reportedly remarked it was a pity that Callender
had not been hanged in a prior vagrancy case.191  At Justice Chase’s impeach-
ment trial, one prosecution witness testified that “if the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia was not utterly depraved, or that if a jury of honest men could be found
there, [Chase] would punish Callender.”192  On May 23, 1800, Justice Chase
convened a grand jury and charged them with investigating Callender’s viola-
tions of the Sedition Law.193  The grand jury agreed and the District Attorney
indicted, quoting twenty passages from The Prospect Before Us.194  “Callender
was charged with maliciously designing to defame President Adams by writing
and publishing the words with intent to bring him into contempt and to excite
the hatred of the good people of the United States toward him.”195  A second
count charged Callender with “causing or procuring these false, scandalous,
and malicious statements to be printed and published.”196  Virginia, which had
twice condemned the Sedition Law as unconstitutional in its own legislature,
provided funding for Callender’s defense.197  During pre-trial arguments, Jus-
tice Chase “bluntly branded Callender’s [pamphlet] as false; the defendant’s
bad intentions seemed ‘sufficiently obvious’ to the judge.”198  While seating
the jury, Justice Chase allegedly instructed the Federal Marshal to strike from
185 Id. at 161-62 (emphasis and brackets omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Callender, in STATE
TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS
688-90 (Francis Wharton ed., 1849)).
186 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 287 (quoting CALLENDER, supra note 183).
187 Smith, supra note 180, at 163.
188 Id. at 164 (quoting RICHMOND EXAMINER, May 9, 1800).
189 Id. at 164-65 (quoting Chase to James McHenry, Dec. 4, 1798, in THE LIFE AND CORRE-
SPONDENCE OF JAMES MCHENRY, SECRETARY OF WAR UNDER WASHINGTON AND ADAMS
203 (Bernard C. Steiner ed., 1907)).
190 CALLENDER, supra note 183.
191 Smith, supra note 180, at 165 (quoting James Triplett).
192 Carrington, supra note 55, at 488 (quoting John Thompson Mason). See also
Humphrey, supra note 134, at 287-88.




197 Id. at 168.
198 Id. at 171.
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the jury panel “any of those creatures or people called democrats.”199  When
“the [M]arshal replied that he . . . made no discrimination, . . . Judge Chase told
him to look over the panel and if there were any of that description to strike
them off.”200  “[T]he jury . . . consisted exclusively of Federalists.”201
The conduct of the “case is best remembered not for the government’s
plea but for Judge Chase’s rulings against the defense.”202  He refused to per-
mit the defense attorneys to argue the constitutionality of the Sedition Law to
the jury, as was custom at the time.203  Callender’s lawyers were so frustrated
that successive defense counsel withdrew from the case, leaving Callender
undefended.204  There is some credible evidence, however, that Callender’s
lawyers were more interested in advancing their own careers and “scoring . . .
points against the Adams administration than” with providing Callender a
defense.205  Later, at Justice Chase’s impeachment trial, witnesses testified that
Justice Chase’s comments to Callender’s lawyers “were ‘in a high degree impe-
rious, satyrical and witty,’ and that ‘the audience enjoyed considerable mirth at
the expense of the counsel.’”206  The jury convicted after two hours of deliber-
ation and Justice Chase declared that the verdict was “pleasing to him, because
it shewed that the laws of the United States could be enforced in Virginia
. . . .”
207
 Justice Chase said that until he had read Callender’s writings, “he had
not thought there was so bad a man in the United States.”208  He was
“‘extremely happy . . . that Callender was not a native American.’”209  Justice
Chase “sentenced Callender to nine months in jail,” fined him $200, “and
bound him over on a $1,200 bond” for two years of good behavior.210  Cal-
lender stayed in prison until the day the Sedition Law expired, March 3,
1801.211
In addition to the Callender case, Judge Chase was impeached for this
handling of the treason case of John Fries.212  Fries was part of a 1799 armed
uprising protesting new federal internal revenue laws involving taxes on houses
199 Id. (quoting CHARLES EVANS, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HONORABLE SAMUEL
CHASE 43-44 (1805) [hereinafter CHASE TRIAL]). But see Stephen B. Presser & Becky Bair
Hurley, Saving God’s Republic:  The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
771, 809 (1984) (stating “there is no credible evidence” to support this charge).
200 Carrington, supra note 55, at 489 (quoting John Heath).
201 Smith, supra note 180, at 171.
202 Id. at 176.
203 Id. at 177. See also Carrington, supra note 55, at 487-88 (“[T]he impression that a
lawyer had the right to argue not only facts but also the law of a criminal case to a jury, and
even to persuade them to disregard the opinion and instructions of the court, was very strong
at that time.”); Humphrey, supra note 134, at 286.
204 Smith, supra note 180, at 177-78.
205 See Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at 810.
206 Carrington, supra note 55, at 488 (quoting John Taylor).
207 Smith, supra note 180, at 178 (quoting RICHMOND EXAMINER, June 6, 1800).
208 Id. at 179.
209 Id. (quoting Robertson’s Transcript in CHASE TRIAL, supra note 199, at 94).
210 Id. at 180.
211 Id. at 180 & n.84.
212 Carrington, supra note 55, at 487.  For an extensive description of the Fries trial and
discussion on Chase’s motivation during the trial, see Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at
802-08.
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and land.213  The revenue law was passed “to meet expenses of [putting down]
the [1794 Whiskey Rebellion].”214  Fries’ role in the uprising was not insignifi-
cant–he “led an armed assault to free federal prisoners arrested for resisting the
collection of the tax.”215  Fries was described by one historian as a “sort of
traveling fakir, of ready tongue and turbulent disposition . . . .”216  Fries was
initially tried before Judges Iredell and Peters, convicted, and sentenced to
death.217  He was “granted a new trial when one juror was found to [be
biased],”218 which was heard before Judge Chase and Judge Peters, a district
judge.219  Judge Chase was convinced Fries’ first trial took too long and he
“was determined that his Circuit court would demonstrate the certainty and
efficiency of federal justice.”220  “On the day of the trial Judge Chase handed
. . . the clerk a written opinion stating that he had carefully considered the law,
and had written . . . his opinion,” with multiple copies for the District Attorney,
defense counsel and the jury.221  Fries’ counsel refused to proceed with the
case and Fries was convicted and sentenced to death.222  President Adams had
such misgivings about the case that he later pardoned Fries.223  The impeach-
ment complaint against Justice Chase centered on his “form[ing] and
render[ing] an opinion [about] the law without allowing counsel to argue
. . . .”
224
“The impeachment trial [in the Senate] opened on January 3, 1805.”225
“As the day of the trial approached, hundreds of people [gathered in] Washing-
ton.”226  Vice-President Aaron Burr, “under two state indictments for the mur-
der of Alexander Hamilton” during a duel in the preceding summer, presided
over the trial.227  On February 4, Justice Chase answered the charges against
him by “explain[ing] his conduct on the first seven [charges] and deny[ing] the
eighth charge [completely].”228  In assessing the prosecution’s performance
during the impeachment trial, historians have not been kind.  One writes:
“[T]he affair was bungled from start to finish, and the incident mangled the
political reputations of all those intimately connected with it.”229  Another
comments:  “When confronted with such lawyers as defended Chase [Ran-
213 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 285.
214 Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at 802.
215 Id.
216 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 285.
217 Id.
218 Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at 803.
219 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 285.
220 Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at 803.
221 Carrington, supra note 55, at 487 (emphasis omitted).
222 Id.
223 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 285.
224 Carrington, supra note 55, at 487.
225 Knudson, supra note 58, at 65.
226 Lillich, supra note 77, at 62.
227 Knudson, supra note 58, at 65.
228 Id. at 66.
229 Id. at 60. See also Lillich, supra note 77, at 57, 63 (commenting that “[t]he House
managers [were] good politicians but poor lawyers” and Randolph “was totally inadequate to
conduct a major state trial”).
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dolph] found it utterly impossible to make head against the current of legal
reasoning and authority adduced by them.”230
The prosecution began its case on February 9, and over the next four days
called eighteen witnesses, of which six were cross-examined by the defense.231
The defense opened on February 15, calling “thirty-one witnesses in four
days.”232  On February 20, eight days of closing arguments began.233  One
memorable moment in the prosecution’s case came during Randolph’s closing
argument, when he argued that juries had the right to determine the meaning of
the law.  He said:
Suppose a man should be indicted for killing another.  Some circumstances will
amount to a justification, such as being in defence of his person, and, which I con-
sider equally as sacred, in defence of his character and reputation.  If I were on the
jury, and it appeared that the person indicted had killed the other in defence of his
character and reputation, I will not find him guilty of murder, though directed by all
the courts of the nation.234
The thinly veiled reference to Vice-President Burr’s legal problems was
called a “palpable ‘gallery shot.’”235
Joseph Hopkinson, a thirty-four year old lawyer, opened for the
defense.236  He said:  “We appear for an ancient and infirm man, whose better
days have been worn out in the service of that country which now degrades
him, and who has nothing to promise you for an honorable acquittal but the
approbation of your own consciences.”237  On the matter of Justice Chase’s
refusal to permit Callender’s lawyers to argue the constitutionality of the Sedi-
tion Law to the jury, there appears to have been a “real difference of opinion”
on whether this was a role for the jury or the judge.238  Another lawyer for
Justice Chase was Luther Martin,
[P]robably the greatest trial lawyer in the United States, known as the ‘Federalist
bulldog.’  A man who enjoys the distinction of having been supported in his last days
by the levy of a special license tax by the State of Maryland of five dollars upon
every lawyer at the bar.239
Martin reputedly “knew more law drunk than the managers did sober.”240
Martin, in addressing the point to the Senate, said:
I, Sir, have always considered it the province of the Court in the course of a trial, in
all cases, whether civil or criminal, to declare what is the law. . . .  When a case
comes before a jury, the Court informs them what is the law if they believe the facts
given in evidence; if they do believe the facts, they are bound in duty to decide
according to the law explained to them by the Courts.241
230 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 289.
231 Knudson, supra note 58, at 66.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 286-87.
235 Id. at 286.
236 Carrington, supra note 55, at 493.
237 Id. (quoting Joseph Hopkinson).
238 Id. at 495.
239 Id.
240 Lillich, supra note 77, at 63.
241 Carrington, supra note 55, at 495.
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As a matter of fact, some historians have characterized Justice Chase as
the source for “the doctrine that the national judiciary had the exclusive tasks of
determining the constitutionality of Congressional legislation, and invalidating
any acts which failed to conform with that national charter.”242  One of the petit
jurors in the Callender trial, testifying in Justice Chase’s defense, characterized
the trial as follows:
It appeared to me that the defense which the counsel for Callender attempted to
make, was the constitutionality of the law, and that they had no hopes of saving him
except on this ground; and that when the judge determined that the law was constitu-
tional.  and [sic] that they should not address their arguments to the jury on that point,
they became extremely mortified.243
In making their arguments, Justice Chase’s lawyers repeatedly made the
point that in order for a Judge to be removed, the Judge must have committed
an indictable offense.244  Joseph Hopkinson remarked:
Does such a court [United States Senate] act to scan and to punish petty errors and
indiscretions too insignificant to have a name in the penal code, too paltry for the
notice of a court of quarter sessions?  Is the Senate of the United States . . . to fix a
standard of politeness in a judge, and mark the precincts of judicial decorum?245
If Judges could be removed for conduct less than that which is indictable,
they argued, the Constitution’s prohibition against removal of Judges during
“good behavior” would be violated.246  Robert Harper, in closing for the
defense, urged the Senators to not allow “their decisions to be swayed or influ-
enced by any party [affiliations].”247  In rebuttal for the prosecution, Randolph
stated:
We demand not that an independent judge shall be removed from office.  There are
independent judges on the bench, whose dismissal we do not seek.  We only ask that
a man, who is unworthy of the high judicial station which he fills, should be dis-
missed from the service of his country at the age of seventy years.  A man who has
marked his whole character with oppression, and been constantly employed in
preaching politics and construing treason.248
Of the witnesses called by the defense, perhaps the most interesting was
Chief Justice Marshall.  One historian writes:
It is evident that he did not regard his colleague as a model judge, and, while unwill-
ing to publicly condemn him, was in no way pleased that his turbulent disposition
and factional temper had involved the court in an ugly dispute at a time when the
utmost caution was necessary to its firm establishment.249
242 Presser & Hurley, supra note 199, at 772.  The authors argue that Marshall, who sat in
the audience during the Callender trial, “absorbed” Chase’s lessons for future use. Id.  They
also argue that “[w]hat Chase did in Callender required much more political courage” than
what Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison, “because Chase was performing before a hostile
audience in Virginia.” Id.
243 Carrington, supra note 55, at 489.
244 Lillich, supra note 77, at 57.
245 Carrington, supra note 55, at 494 (quoting Joseph Hopkinson).
246 Knudson, supra note 58, at 65.
247 Carrington, supra note 55, at 497.
248 Knudson, supra note 58, at 66-67 (quoting John Randolph).
249 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 282.
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Another argument made strongly by Justice Chase’s lawyers surrounded
Justice Chase’s rights as a citizen, even after his appointment to the Supreme
Court.  Harper, arguing the point, said:  “Is it not lawful for an aged patriot of
the revolution to warn his fellow-citizens of dangers, by which he supposes
their liberties and happiness to be threatened?  Or will it be contended that a
citizen is deprived of these rights, because he is a judge?”250  Harper also
argued the Constitution contained no express prohibition against Judges from
engaging in political speech to a jury.251
Upon polling the Senators on each of the eight articles of impeachment,
nineteen votes (short of the twenty-three needed for conviction) “were the most
the Republicans could muster” on the eighth article concerning Justice Chase’s
speech in Baltimore.252  Not one Senator voted to convict on the fifth article,
alleging an error in judgment.253  Six Republican Senators deserted the party
completely, “voting ‘not guilty’ on all eight articles.”254  Randolph left the Sen-
ate Chamber and went straight to the House, where he introduced a resolution
for a constitutional amendment to provide for removal of federal judges by the
President upon joint address of both Houses of Congress.255  On March 1,
1805, Vice President Burr presiding as President of the Senate, announced Jus-
tice Chase had been acquitted.256
Justice Chase “resumed his seat on the bench and retained it until his death
in Washington, D.C., on June 19, 1811 . . .”257  “In the judgment of Henry
Adams, ‘The failure of Chase’s impeachment was a blow to the Republican
party from which it never wholly recovered.’”258  While the judiciary was con-
sidered “the weakest of the three branches of government, . . . under the Jeffer-
sonian attack it proved to be the toughest.”259  Several years later, President
Jefferson “bemoan[ed] that impeachment was a ‘mere scarecrow.’”260  Follow-
ing Justice Pickering’s removal and Justice Chase’s acquittal, Congress did not
attempt impeachment of a federal judge again until 1831, when Judge James
Peck was impeached (he was acquitted in the Senate), and then many years
followed before Charles Swayne was impeached in 1904.261
Historians typically point to the Chase impeachment as an important mile-
stone in establishing the independence of the judiciary and establishing the pre-
cedent that judges should not be removed merely for political speech from the
bench.262  If Justice Chase had been convicted, the conviction
250 Westin, supra note 116, at 643.
251 Id.




256 U.S. SENATE JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 1, 1805).
257 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Chase, Samuel, supra note 78.
258 Knudson, supra note 58, at 55.
259 Id.
260 Lillich, supra note 77, at 70.
261 See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts:  Impeachments of Fed-
eral Judges, supra note 59.
262 See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Chase, Samuel, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 161 (Kermit Hall, James W. Ely, Jr. & Joel B.
Grossman eds., 2d ed. 2005). See also Carrington, supra note 55, at 499 (“A conviction of
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would . . . have established the proposition[ ] . . . that a judge could be addressed out
of office whenever his political opponents could command the necessary majority to
that end.  This would have destroyed the Supreme Court, or have so weakened its
character as to make its influence of small moment in the formative period of this
republic.”263
While that characterization is probably true, the impeachment nevertheless sent
a strong signal to judges that engaging in openly partisan political activity was
dangerous.264  Indeed, in the wake of the impeachment, historians point to three
results.  First, the manners of federal judges improved remarkably.265  Second,
“federal judges refrained from active participation in politics.”266  Finally,
threats of impeachment of federal judges for their political opinions have
largely disappeared from mainstream discourse.267
IV. EX PARTE MCCARDLE
After the Chase impeachment proved the futility of impeachment as a leg-
islative tool to check the judiciary, attention in Congress turned to the use of
jurisdiction as a means of controlling the courts.  Attempts to strip the Court of
its jurisdiction to hear cases are nothing new in American legal history.  After
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,268 for example, when the Court affirmed its author-
ity to invalidate unconstitutional state laws, states’ rights advocates attempted
to strip the Court of its jurisdiction to review state laws altogether.269  In the
1950’s, Congress considered legislation to “remove certain internal security
laws from the possibility of Supreme Court invalidation.”270  In the 1960’s,
proposals to preclude judicial review of obscenity laws were considered.271  In
the 1980’s, there were a number of proposals that would have stripped courts of
the power to hear cases on abortion272 and school prayer.273  More recently, the
Chase might well have had a bad influence, and would have encouraged the Republicans in
their assaults upon the power of the judiciary.”).
263 Humphrey, supra note 134, at 298.
264 Id.  See also Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals:  A History of Federal
Judicial Service–And Disservice–1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1993); Knudson,
supra note 58, at 75 (“[T]here was little doubt that in the first head-on encounter between the
newspapers and courts in the young Republic, the judiciary had triumphed but its political
role had been blunted.”).
265 Knudson, supra note 58, at 71. See also Humphrey, supra note 134, at 295.
266 Knudson, supra note 58, at 75. See also Humphrey, supra note 134, at 296.
267 Knudson, supra note 58, at 75. But see Lise Olsen & Harvey Rice, Could Kent Lose His
Bench?:  Judge May Face Congress Over Abuse Allegations, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 7,
2007, at B1 (reporting on possible impeachment proceedings against United States district
Judge Samuel B. Kent for sexual harassment).
268 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
269 Christopher T. Handman, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court
Jurisdiction:  Applying a New External Constraint to Congress’s Exceptions Clause Power,
106 YALE L.J. 197, 201 n.23 (1996).
270 William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229,
230 (1973).
271 Id.
272 See, e.g., Right to Life Act of 1981, H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981).
273 See, e.g., Voluntary School Prayer Act of 1981, H.R. 2347, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981). See
also Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause:  Legislative Attempts
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 have all contained jurisdiction-stripping provisions.274  Introduced
but unenacted legislation seeks to prevent federal courts from hearing any case
involving a federal officer’s acknowledgement of God,275  to prevent federal
courts from considering international law,276 the free exercise or establishment
clause,277 the right to privacy,278 an equal protection challenge to marriage
laws,279 challenge to specific legislation,280 challenges to state pornography
laws,281 and royalties under certain offshore oil and gas leases.282  In one nota-
ble speech, Senator Jesse Helms said:  “In anticipation of judicial usurpations
of power, the framers of our Constitution wisely gave the Congress the author-
ity, by a simple majority of both Houses, to check the Supreme Court by means
of regulation of its appellate jurisdiction.”283  Even Chief Justice John Roberts,
as a special assistant to Reagan’s Attorney General, William French Smith,
“provided a vigorous argument as to why it would be constitutional for Con-
gress to enact a law that would strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over
school prayer and busing cases.”284  The most well-known, and perhaps notori-
ous, example of jurisdiction stripping, however, remains Ex parte McCardle.285
A. The South Attempts to Use the Courts to Thwart Reconstruction
After the Civil War, Republicans embarked on an ambitious plan of
Reconstruction.  After adopting the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, Congress also “adopted far-reaching substantive statutes to
secure the federal protection of civil rights and civil liberties.”286  To ensure
these statutes were not subverted by legacy Southern governments, “Congress
enacted sweeping Reconstruction legislation that placed much of the South
under military government” in 1867.287
The Southern aristocracy, alarmed at the plans launched by Radical
Republicans to address Reconstruction (especially those aimed at the so-called
to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983)
(tracing jurisdiction stripping attempts in the 1980’s).
274 For a discussion of these laws, see generally Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction:  Congres-
sional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts–Opposition, Agreement,
and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998).
275 Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 101 (1st Sess. 2005).
276 Id. § 201.
277 We the People Act, H.R. 300, 110th Cong. § 3(1)(A) (1st Sess. 2007).
278 Id. § 3(1)(B).
279 Id. § 3(1)(C).
280 Marriage Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 724, 110th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2007).
281 The Pornography Jurisdiction Limitation Act of 2006, H.R. 5528, 109th Cong. § 2 (2d
Sess. 2006).
282 Deep Water Royalty Jurisdiction Act, H.R. 5231, 109th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess. 2006).
283 125 CONG. REC. 7579 (1979) (statement of Sen. Helms).
284 Neil A. Lewis, Newly Released Memos Show More of Roberts’s Role in Earlier Admin-
istrations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A14.
285 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
286 Alstyne, supra note 270 at 236.
287 William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court:  “The First Hundred Years Were the Hard-
est,” 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 485 (1988).
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Black Codes which permitted a form of slavery to continue in the South),
attempted several times to use the courts to attack these plans.288  In Missis-
sippi v. Johnson,289 the suit sought to enjoin the President from enforcing the
Reconstruction Acts as unconstitutional.290  The Court failed to reach the mer-
its of the case, holding instead that the President was immune from such
suits.291  In another case, Georgia v. Stanton,292 the Court held that a suit to
enjoin a cabinet member from enforcing the Reconstruction Acts was a nonjus-
ticiable political question,293 thus once again avoiding a direct confrontation
with the Republicans. Any hopes the Southerners held for help from President
Johnson were quickly dwindling as the Republicans continuously blocked his
efforts to moderate Reconstruction, leading to his eventual impeachment and
trial in the middle of the McCardle affair.294
B. Ex parte Milligan and the Congress-Court Relationship
One of the tools the Republicans deployed in the South was to replace
civilian courts with military commissions.  In Ex parte Milligan,295 the Court
finally tackled the constitutionality of this central tenet of the Republicans’
plans.296  The Court held that using military commissions to try citizens when
functioning civilian courts were available violated the Constitution.297  The
Court was so sensitive to the case that it prevented reporters from taking notes
during the reading of the opinion “to ensure accuracy when the decisions them-
selves were published.”298  “The decision outraged the Radical Republicans,”
and “[t]he Radical Republican press described the Court’s decision as ‘judicial
tyranny’ and ‘constitutional twaddle.’”299  In enforcing the Court’s decision,
President Johnson ended the use of military tribunals to try Southern civilians,
a move that prompted a motion to impeach him.300  Meanwhile, Congress
examined means of retaliating against the Court by introducing legislation to
restrict the number of Justices by preventing appointments as vacancies
occurred.301  Congressman Thaddeus Stevens used the Milligan decision to
288 See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:  Early Imple-
mentation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1594
(1986).
289 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
290 Id. at 475.
291 Id. at 501.
292 Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
293 Id. at 77.  See also Stanley Kutler, Ex parte McCardle:  Judicial Impotency? The
Supreme Court and Reconstruction Reconsidered, 72 AM. HIST. REV. 835, 839 (1967) (not-
ing the Georgia and Mississippi decisions helped the Court avoid a “direct confrontation”
with Congress).
294 See Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595, 1599 n.306, 600.
295 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
296 Id. at 108-09.
297 Id. at 107.
298 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:  Reconstruc-
tion’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 11 (2002).
299 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1594 n.288 (quoting WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT:  A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 36 (1962)).
300 Id.
301 Id. at 1595 n.288.
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push through more Reconstruction legislation, claiming the Court’s decision
made immediate action by Congress “absolutely indispensable.”302 Milligan,
he argued, “‘may appear ‘not as infamous as the Dred Scott decision’, but in
truth it was ‘far more dangerous’ by reason of ‘its operation upon the lives and
the liberties of the loyal men’, black and white, in the South.’”303  Congress-
man James Ashley from Ohio “reminded his audience that if the Court again
issued a ‘political decision,’ Congress could take advantage of the constitu-
tional mode of getting rid of the Court, as well as the President.”304  Congress-
man Ashley felt the Constitution made the legislative branch the “master of the
situation.”305
Some commentators have described Reconstruction as the “ultimate judi-
cial acceptance of legislative control over judicial power.”306  Chief Justice
Rehnquist described the period as one where the Court entered a “‘Babylonian
captivity’ to the radical Republicans in Congress.”307  The Court’s opinion in
Dred Scott v. Sandford308 still angered the Republicans, and they were not
willing to allow the Court to once again interfere with their plans.309 Milligan
continued to feed the worst of Republican fears about judicial usurpation of
Reconstruction plans and Congress was swift to move to protect the legisla-
tion.310 Milligan sent a “wave of alarm through the [Republican] party.”311
The party’s determination to protect Reconstruction legislation defined its rela-
tionship with the Court.312  The Justices, therefore, had to themselves “walk a
very narrow and careful path during this period.”313
Congressional retaliation for Milligan was swift.  In 1866, the same year
as Milligan, Congress moved to provide that no vacancy on the Court would be
filled until the Court fell to six members.314  (There is some evidence to sug-
gest that Chief Justice Chase was involved in this legislation, suggesting the
reduction in numbers in order to justify his call for an increase in Justices’
salaries.315  In 1869, just ten days after Republicans celebrated the swearing-in
of President Ulysses Grant, they raised the number of Justices again, “allowing
President Grant to appoint an additional Justice.”316)  In 1867, Congress
debated legislation to decrease the number of Justices that constituted a quorum
302 Kutler, supra note 293, at 837.
303 Friedman, supra note 298, at 14 (quoting 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES:  RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 PART ONE, at 267 (1971)) (internal quo-
tations omitted).
304 Kutler, supra note 293, at 837.
305 Id.
306 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1594.
307 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 485.
308 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
309 See Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 485.
310 Kutler, supra note 293, at 837.
311 Id. at 837-38.
312 Id. at 837.
313 Friedman, supra note 298, at 6.
314 Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
315 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 486.  Chief Justice Chase also pressed for legislation
changing his title from “Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States” to “Chief
Justice of the United States.” Id.
316 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1596 n.293.
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from six to five.317  Then, in 1868, Congress proposed legislation that would
have required a two-thirds majority from the Court to invalidate legislation as
unconstitutional.318  There is some evidence to suggest that this last piece of
legislation was a direct response to fears that the Court would hear the McCar-
dle case and eventually overrule a key piece of Reconstruction legislation.319
Senator Charles Sumner, in a speech advocating passage of the bill, said
allowing a bare majority of the court to void acts of Congress was “‘contrary to
reason, almost contrary to common sense.’”320  Ultimately, the proposal to
require two-thirds vote of the Court to overturn Congress failed.321  As one
commentator said: “There was, in any event, an ambiguous and unreal quality
to the two-thirds proposal, for it amounted to saying that six justices might do
what five could not.”322  The press joined in the criticism of the Court, with the
New York Herald, for example, editorializing in 1867:
Shall the opinions of a bare majority of these nine old superannuated pettifoggers of
the Supreme Court, left to the country as the legacy of the old defunct Southern
slaveholding oligarchy, prevail, or shall these old marplots make way for the will of
the sovereign people and the national constitution as expounded by Washington and
Hamilton, and as established by a million of Union bayonets in a four years’ civil
war?  That is the great question for 1868.323
At the same time, the battle between Congress and the President was
already in full swing.  The “predominant question[ ] that split the branches
[was] the terms on which the Southern states would return to the Union, as well
as which branch of government would have the power to make that deci-
sion.”324  In 1866, President Johnson had left the Republican Party after he
vetoed civil rights legislation and the veto was later overridden.325  For the
remainder of his presidency, he battled Congress’ plans for Reconstruction and
was eventually impeached, becoming the first President in history to be
impeached (he escaped Senate conviction by only one vote).326  In this highly
politicized environment, the Court found itself, in McCardle, front and center
in the battle over Reconstruction.
317 S. 163, 40th Cong. (2d Sess. 1867).
318 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1868).
319 See id., where Congressman Williams of Pennsylvania said:
It is said that there is a case now depending in the Supreme Court of the United States upon
which this question may be ruled to-day or to-morrow.  Suppose such be the fact–I do not know
that there is any such case–but suppose such be the fact, that such a case is now depending there,
and a decision is made by the court, what harm can it effect?  Instead of harm I think it will do
good, because it will awaken both Houses of Congress to the necessity of some such provision as
this, intended, as it is, to defend the legislative power, which is the true sovereign power of the
nation.
320 Kutler, supra note 293, at 838 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 504 (1868)).
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Congress and the Supreme Court–The Great Issue for the Next Presidency, N.Y. HER-
ALD, Jan. 5, 1867, at 4, quoted in Friedman, supra note 298, at 24.
324 Friedman, supra note 298, at 6.
325 Id. at 10.
326 See id. at 15.
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C. McCardle’s Poison Pen
William H. McCardle was an editor of the Vicksburg Times.327  A mem-
ber of the former Southern aristocracy, he venomously attacked and criticized
the Republican plans for Reconstruction.328  In one 1867 editorial, he wrote:
We said a few days since that to be a military satrap, in the poor downtrodden South,
was, ex necessitate rei, to be a scoundrel . . . they [military government] are each and
all infamous, cowardly, and abandoned villains who, instead of wearing shoulder
straps and ruling millions of people, should have their heads shaved, their ears
cropped, their foreheads branded, and their persons lodged in a penitentiary.329
He was eventually arrested for disturbing the peace and inciting insurrec-
tion, disorder, and violence, in violation of Reconstruction legislation.330  Since
McCardle was detained under the Reconstruction laws, any attack on his deten-
tion would necessarily involve an attack on the constitutionality of the Recon-
struction laws themselves.331  That attack came when McCardle petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court at Jackson, Mississippi, claiming his
arrest and detention were unconstitutional.332
D. 1867 Habeas Corpus Act and McCardle I
McCardle’s attack on his detention was based on the habeas corpus statute
of February 5, 1867.333  This legislation had greatly expanded the prior habeas
corpus statute334 “to afford federal protection to the wives and children of black
soldiers who enlisted in the Union Army”335 and to “destroy the vestiges of
slavery.”336  It was also seen as a “means of enforcing the recently ratified
Thirteenth Amendment.”337  According to the bill’s sponsors, Representative
William Lawrence and Senator Lyman Trumbull, the Act was designed to pro-
tect former slaves “who were being reduced to new forms of slavery because of
state vagrancy and apprentice laws,” the so-called Black Codes.338  Prior to
passage of the law, the writ could only be obtained before trial, and it could
only be used “to question the legality of [a] detention by executive officials.”339
The 1867 law allowed “a form of review after trial of federal and state convic-
327 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595.
328 Id.
329 Alstyne, supra note 270, at 236 n.42.
330 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595; Handman, supra note 269, at 202.
331 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595.
332 Id.
333 Id. See also Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
334 The prior habeas corpus statute was the Judiciary Act of 1789, a “restrictive” grant of
habeas power.  William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction:  The Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, 36 J.S. HIST. 530, 533 (1970). See also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73.
335 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595.
336 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 536.
337 Id. at 538.
338 Kutler, supra note 293, at 840.
339 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 531.
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tions.”340  In this way, the 1867 law “enabled the federal courts to assert their
primacy in deciding questions affecting individual liberty.”341
The circuit court rejected McCardle’s petition, but released him on $2000
bail.342  Throughout the remainder of the litigation, McCardle “continued to
write diatribes against” Reconstruction and officials implementing it.343  Under
the new 1867 habeas corpus legislation, appeals could be taken directly to the
Supreme Court, allowing McCardle’s counsel to take his case there.344
The government, led by Senator Trumbull, immediately filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the 1867 Act.345  “[On] February 17, 1868
Chief Justice Chase rejected [the] government[’s] motion to dismiss.”346  He
held the Act was “of the most comprehensive character.  It brings within the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and every judge every possible case of
privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws.  It is
impossible to widen this jurisdiction.”347  He concluded that the Court “enter-
tain[s] no doubt, therefore, that an appeal lies to this court from the judgment of
the Circuit Court in the case before us.”348
Oral argument in McCardle was scheduled and extended beyond the time
normally granted–two hours per side, to six hours per side, for a total of four
days.349  On one of the argument days, argument was interrupted while Chief
Justice Chase presided over a Senate trial in the impeachment of President
Johnson.350  During argument, McCardle’s lawyers argued that Congress could
not turn Mississippi into a military district at peacetime, relying on Milligan.351
The government urged the Court to dismiss the case as a political question.352
The case was submitted on March 9, 1868.353
E. 1867 Act Repealed
The Court was never able to deliver its judgment on the constitutionality
of McCardle’s detention by military authorities in the South.  The Republicans
were “[a]larmed and unified” that the Court had agreed to hear McCardle’s
case.354  “By the time that the Court held its conference on the McCardle case,
on March 21, 1868,” legislation that would strip the Court of jurisdiction to
hear any cases under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act had passed “both houses of
340 Id. (emphasis omitted). See also Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
341 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 532.
342 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1595.
343 Id.
344 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.
345 Kutler, supra note 293, at 840. See also Alstyne, supra note 270, at 237-38 (explaining
in detail the nature of the government’s motion to dismiss); Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch.
27, 14 Stat. 385 (1868).
346 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1598.
347 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1868).
348 Id. at 326.
349 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 487.
350 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 271.
351 Id. at 271-72.
352 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 487.
353 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1599.
354 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 542.
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Congress and awaited President Johnson’s signature.”355  The law was intro-
duced quietly in the House, as an amendment to another bill to amend the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to provide for Supreme Court review of any judgment
against a revenue officer.356  “The amendment passed . . . without debate or
division.”357  The legislation encountered violent opposition in the Senate, with
the Democrats becoming “ardent defenders of the federal judiciary . . . .”358  In
further debate in the House, Representative Robert Schneck, one of the spon-
sors of the repealer legislation, revealed his true intention, saying:
I have lost confidence in the majority of the Supreme Court. . . .  I believe that they
usurp power whenever they dare to undertake to settle questions purely political, in
regard to the status of the States, and the manner in which those States are to be held
subject to the lawmaking power.359
He insisted he had a right to “‘clip the wings of that [C]ourt whenever I
can, in any attempt to take such flights.’”360
There is also some evidence that Republicans were motivated in large part
by the Democratic press of the day, which had been crowing about the Court’s
upcoming ruling in McCardle.361  Representative Wilson claimed Republicans
would not have intervened with the Court, but:
[W]hen we were told day by day that the majority of the court has practically made
up its judgment, not only to pass upon the sufficiency of the return to the writ, which
involves the only question properly before them in the McCardle case, but also to do
as the court did once before in the Dred Scott case, go outside of the record properly
involving the questions really presented for its determination, undertaking to infringe
upon the political power of Congress, and declare the laws . . . unconstitutional, it
was our duty to intervene by a repeal of the jurisdiction and prevent the threatened
calamity falling upon the country.362
“The calamity [he] feared was, in his own words, ‘that the McCardle case
was to be made use of to enable a majority of that Court to determine the
invalidity and unconstitutionality of the reconstruction laws of Congress.’”363
If the Court wanted to, it could have decided the McCardle case there and
then, sidestepping the issue of the jurisdiction-stripping legislation before it
became law.  At the conference, however, the Court decided instead to post-
pone consideration of the McCardle case until the fate of the legislation was
known.364  Justices Robert Grier and Stephen Field vehemently opposed the
decision to delay the case, but they were unable to convince their colleagues to
change their minds.365  Justice David Davis characterized the delay as being
355 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1599.
356 Kutler, supra note 293, at 840.
357 Id.
358 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 542.
359 Kutler, supra note 293, at 841 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1883-84
(1868)).
360 Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1883-84 (1868)).
361 Id. at 841-42.
362 Id. at 842 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2062 (1868)).
363 Alstyne, supra note 270, at 239 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2062
(1868)).
364 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1599-1600 n.306.
365 Id.  Justice Grier wrote:
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“‘unjudicial to run a race with Congress, and especially as the bill might be
signed at any moment by the President.’”366  “McCardle’s lawyers feared the
worst,” with one “express[ing] his outrage at what he viewed as the Court’s
‘knuckling under’.”367  Jeremiah Black, another lawyer for McCardle, “bitterly
complained that ‘the court stood still to be ravished and did not even hallo
while the thing was being done.’”368
On March 25, 1868 (four days after the Court’s conference on McCardle
and five days before his impeachment trial began), President Johnson vetoed
the repealer legislation.369  President Johnson felt that the legislation was “not
in harmony with the spirit and intention of the Constitution,” and that the bill
“establishes a precedent which, if followed, may eventually sweep away every
check on arbitrary and unconstitutional legislation.”370  Two days later, Con-
gress overrode the President’s veto and the bill became law.371  Senator Trum-
bull, in arguments for the override, allayed Democratic fears about repealing
the 1867 habeas corpus law, arguing the country “had survived quite well”
under the older 1789 law.372  Trumbull concluded that the 1867 law had been
meant to protect federal officers and newly-freed slaves in the South and the
Court had misconstrued the original meaning of the 1867 law, thus making
repeal necessary.373
The Court scheduled a new set of oral arguments for its December 1868
term on the effect the repealer legislation had on the already-submitted McCar-
dle case.374  “McCardle’s counsel called [the case] ‘one of the greatest cases
that has ever been heard before any tribunal.’”375  On April 12, 1869, the Court
handed down its decision in McCardle.376  In the opinion, Chief Justice Chase
notes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is granted “with such
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.”377  According
to Chief Justice Chase, the repealer bill’s repeal of the grant of jurisdiction in
the 1867 Act was complete and effective:  “It is hardly possible to imagine a
The country and the parties had a right to expect that it [McCardle case] would receive the
immediate and solemn attention of this court.  By the postponement of the case we shall subject
ourselves, whether justly or unjustly, to the imputation that we have evaded the performance of a
duty imposed on us by the Constitution, and waited for legislation to interpose to supersede our
action and relieve us from our responsibility.  I am not willing to be a partaker of the eulogy or
opprobrium that may follow . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
366 Kutler, supra note 293, at 844 (quoting Justice Davis).
367 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 488 (quoting C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 PART ONE 478
(1971).
368 Kutler, supra note 293, at 848.
369 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1600.
370 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2094 (1868).
371 Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
372 Kutler, supra note 293, at 843.
373 Id.
374 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1601.
375 Id. at 1594 (quoting 4 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:  RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 452 (1971)).
376 Ex Parte McCardle 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See also Clinton, supra note 288, at
1601.
377 McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513.
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plainer instance of positive exception.”378  Chief Justice Chase was reluctant to
look beyond the plain meaning of the statute, writing:  “We are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature.  We can only examine into its power
under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate juris-
diction of this court is given by express words.”379  Chief Justice Chase there-
fore summarily dismissed the case, writing:
What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case before us?  We cannot
doubt as to this.  Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.380
In addition to fears of Congressional tampering with the Court’s processes
and numbers, McCardle was being decided against the backdrop of Chief Jus-
tice Chase’s own political ambitions.  While he claimed he was “neither candi-
date nor aspirant, . . . Chief Justice Chase, in addition to his duties as Chief
Justice and [his role as] presiding judge of [President Johnson’s] impeachment
tribunal, was [also] quietly seeking the 1868 nomination for the presi-
dency. . . .”381  He unsuccessfully tried to secure the Democratic nomination
after Grant appeared to receive the Republican nomination.382  He was “so bit-
ten by the Presidential bug” that he tried again to win a nomination in 1872.383
F. Post McCardle: Yerger
Although the Court never ruled on the merits of McCardle’s military
detention, Republican apprehensions about what the Court would have done
appeared justified.  In correspondence with the Mississippi federal judge who
had initially dismissed McCardle’s habeas petition, Chief Justice Chase wrote,
“had the merits of the McCardle Case been decided the Court would doubtless
have held that his imprisonment for trial before a military commission was
illegal.”384  Significantly, the Court’s holding in McCardle was limited only to
the effectiveness of the repeal of the 1867 habeas corpus law.385  In the opin-
ion, Chief Justice Chase tantalizingly wrote:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in question,
that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied.  But
this is an error.  The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but
appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867.  It does not affect the jurisdiction
which was previously exercised.386
In writing so, Chief Justice Chase hinted broadly that Section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, an older habeas corpus statute, was unaffected by the
repealer law.387
378 Id. at 514.
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1597-98.
382 Id. at 1598.
383 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 486.
384 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1599.
385 See Handman, supra note 269, at 203 (quoting McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515).
386 McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
387 See Handman, supra note 269, at 203.
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Indeed, six months later, Chief Justice Chase was able to prove his point.
A civilian, Edward M. Yerger, had been arrested and detained for trial by a
military commission in Mississippi for murder of an Army officer.388  Yerger
applied to the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Missis-
sippi for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.389  He then appealed to
the Supreme Court.390  Yerger’s lawyers accepted Chief Justice Chase’s invita-
tion in McCardle and based their appeal on the original Judiciary Act of
1789.391  Chief Justice Chase, on behalf of a unanimous Court, affirmed the
Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ.392  In Ex parte Yerger, Chase wrote:
Our conclusion is, that none of the acts prior to 1867, authorizing this court to exer-
cise appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of habeas corpus, were repealed by
the act of that year . . . and [the 1868 repealer act] must be limited in effect to the
appellate jurisdiction authorized by the act of 1867.393
The Court scolded Congress for the 1868 repealer law, saying:  “legisla-
tion of this character is unusual and hardly to be justified except upon some
imperious public exigency” and asserted that its jurisdiction in habeas cases
“derived from the Constitution” and was only “defined” by the 1789 Act.394
The legislative response to Yerger was far more muted than the roar over
McCardle.  Representative Sumner proposed “abolishing the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction in causes commenced by the writ of habeas corpus.”395  “Senator
[Charles Drake] proposed [an] outright abolition of judicial review of congres-
sional acts.”396  The proposals failed, perhaps as a result of the end of military
reconstruction, even in Mississippi.397  Before Senator Drake’s bill was killed,
however, several lawmakers engaged in passionate defense of the Court.398
Republican Senator George Edmunds, from Vermont, said history
demonstrated:
[The] greatest safeguard of liberty and of private rights . . . is found, not in the
legislative branch of government, not in the executive branch . . . , but in its funda-
mental law that secures those private rights, administered by an independent and
fearless judiciary.  There is the security of liberty; there is the security of progress in
society; there is the anchor that holds together the wishes of all good men.399
G. Historical Treatment of McCardle
McCardle has predictably generated volumes of scholarship about its
meaning and impact.400  Some scholars have been very critical, saying “what
388 Kutler, supra note 293, at 845-46.
389 Id. at 846.
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868).
393 Id.
394 Id. at 102, 104.
395 Kutler, supra note 293, at 849.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 850.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 See, e.g., Handman, supra note 269, at 202 n.27 (“The vast body of commentary makes
it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources” of scholarly articles on this topic.).
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the country actually got from the Court in McCardle was a belated and ill-
considered evasion of the Court’s judicial responsibilities.”401  Chief Justice
Rehnquist opined that McCardle represented a “nadir in its prestige and author-
ity, which had begun to decline with the decision in Dred Scott a decade
before.”402  Justice Benjamin Curtis, in an “often quoted letter, resignedly
noted ‘that the legislative power, . . . with the acquiescence of the country,
conquered one President, and subdued the Supreme Court.”403  Others are more
sanguine, opining that statutes and court opinions of that era reveal “a consis-
tent determination by Congress and the courts to enhance the powers and role
of the federal courts, not to emasculate them.”404  Another commentator says
McCardle “challenges the traditional idea of an impotent and quiescent judici-
ary and suggests, instead, a beginning of the boldness and vitality that charac-
terized the Court in later years.”405
Of course, one’s view of McCardle’s impact depends on how one reads
the opinion.  Some read it as a complete abdication of judicial responsibility to
Congress,406 while others see it as a nuanced and politically savvy decision by
a Court keenly aware of its position in Washington at that time.407  Some schol-
ars have used the decision to argue that in spite of the opinion’s seemingly
broad grant of authority to Congress to carve “exceptions” to appellate jurisdic-
tion, Congress cannot take away jurisdiction from the Court’s “essential role”
in the constitutional plan,408 while others have argued that the opinion justifies
an absolutist view, espousing the theory that Congress has plenary authority to
restrict the Court’s jurisdiction.409  At least one scholar has suggested that
McCardle would be treated very differently today in light of the Court’s devel-
opment of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence:
[T]he use by Congress of the exceptions power to single out a class of cases involv-
ing fundamental rights, withdrawn from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
only from dissatisfaction with the Court’s exercise of its power of substantive consti-
tutional review in respect to such cases, may, ironically, today be subject to fifth
amendment challenge.410
Ultimately, understanding the forces at play during Reconstruction and the
Court’s relationship with Congress is important because, “taken together, they
determine the level of independence of the judiciary from popular politics.  Too
401 Clinton, supra note 288, at 1598.
402 Rehnquist, supra note 287, at 488.
403 Kutler, supra note 293, at 845.
404 Wiecek, supra note 334, at 531.
405 Kutler, supra note 293, at 836.
406 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 288, at 1607 (“Congress and the Supreme Court had stood
toe to toe, locked in constitutional combat, and the Court had chosen to do more than merely
blink.  It vigorously waved a white flag of surrender without putting up any constitutional
fight whatsoever.”).
407 See, e.g., Handman, supra note 269, at 203 (“The Court, no doubt, recognized that a
contrary decision [in McCardle] would invite an inevitable dispute with Congress.”).
408 See generally id. at 206.
409 See generally id. at 208. See also Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions
Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983).
410 Alstyne, supra note 270, at 265.
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much judicial independence may threaten popular sovereignty; too little may
undermine individual liberty.”411
The specter of lifetime-appointed judges voiding key building blocks of
Reconstruction proved too much for the Republicans and they felt compelled to
act in a manner that posed a dangerous threat to an independent judiciary.
While the immediate crisis was averted through the Court’s recognition that it
should not “run a race” with Congress and its skillful postponement of the
issues to another day, the threat of jurisdiction-stripping remains very much a
key instrument in the legislative toolbox to control a judiciary it views as law-
less.  The Military Commissions Act412 is the direct descendant of McCardle,
and it is undoubtedly not the last example of a frustrated Congress reacting to
judges viewed as extraordinarily political.
V. COURT PACKING
A reasonable assertion is that during Reconstruction, the Radical Republi-
cans in Congress were so intent on their legislative agenda for the South that
they were willing to conveniently ignore, or steamroll through, the role of the
President and the Supreme Court in achieving their goals.  Seventy years later,
the Court would find itself once again in the cross-hairs of a branch of govern-
ment focused singularly on its own agenda.  This time, it was the presidency in
the form of President Roosevelt that took aim at the Court.  Unlike the Con-
gress in 1868, however, which conveniently relied on the Exceptions Clause to
take away the McCardle case from the Court, the President’s power over the
Court rested not in jurisdiction, but in appointment.  In 1866, Congress pro-
vided that the number of Justices would be reduced by attrition, from ten to
seven, to prevent President Johnson from making any Supreme Court appoint-
ments.413  In 1869, after President Johnson left office, the number of Justices
was raised to nine, where it has remained ever since.414  In 1937, however, in a
daring and unprecedented move to preserve his New Deal legislation from con-
stitutional death, President Roosevelt proposed a plan that would bring the
number of members on the Court up to fifteen.415
A. President Roosevelt’s First Two Years
The “cataclysmic economic turmoil” of the Depression, along with the rise
of dictatorships around the world, led to President Roosevelt’s election in
1932.416  President Roosevelt offered to use the massive power of the federal
government to help a people in need, and the public responded with force.417
During President Roosevelt’s first term in office, which began in 1932, he was
unable to make any appointments to the Court, a relative rarity in any given
411 Friedman, supra note 298, at 2.
412 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
413 Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
414 Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
415 See infra pp. 118-121.
416 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:  Law’s
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1005-07 (2000).
417 Id. at 1008.
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presidency.418  This may not have bothered Roosevelt too much because the
Court was not directly involved with ruling on the constitutionality of New
Deal legislation in the first two years of his presidency.419  Challenges were
still winding their way through the lower courts and President Roosevelt had
his hands full dealing with the Great Depression.420  “During a period known
as the ‘Hundred Days’ in 1933, Roosevelt sent to Congress a list of ‘must’
legislation” he deemed necessary to allow the country to recover from the
Depression.421  Reform measures included the National Industrial Recovery
Act,422 passed in 1933, a series of statutes to end unregulated competition,
increase prices through production limitations, and a “guarantee [of] a reasona-
ble workweek and a living wage.”423
B. Court Strikes Down New Deal
As the Supreme Court prepared to move to its new building in Washing-
ton, the country anticipated a looming showdown over the constitutionality of
Roosevelt’s plans. Harper’s Magazine wrote:  “Withdrawn from all the noise
and tumult sit the nine old men; they are waiting, waiting for the time when the
question of this government control [to lead the country out of the Depression]
must be brought before them.”424  In 1935, seven of the nine justices had been
appointed by Republican Presidents.425  The Court adhered to a “freedom-of-
contract” theory in the Due Process Clause in its constitutional jurisprudence,
and this theory began affecting the outcome of New Deal legislation.426  The
main proponents of this theory were called the “Four Horsemen of the Apoca-
lypse because of their dire warnings about the catastrophic consequences of
regulatory legislation.”427  The Four Horsemen “rode in the same automobile to
and from the Supreme Court building for oral arguments and for the Saturday
conferences of all nine Justices at which they decided the cases.”428  The Four
Horsemen were:
Willis Van Devanter, appointed by President Taft in 1910 . . . ; James Clark
McReynolds, appointed by President Wilson to get rid of him as United States Attor-
ney General; Pierce Butler, a railroad lawyer appointed by President Harding in
1922. . . ; and George Sutherland, another Harding appointee of that year and a
418 See, e.g., The Supreme Court Historical Society, Appointees Chart, http://www.supreme
courthistory.org/myweb/fp/courtlist2.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
419 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 117.
420 Id. at 116.
421 William H. Rehnquist, The American Constitutional Experience:  Remarks of the Chief
Justice, 54 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1994).
422 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
423 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 116-17.
424 Mitchell Dawson, The Supreme Court and the New Deal, HARPER’S MAG. 641, Nov.
1933, at 641, quoted in Friedman, supra note 416, at 989.
425 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 117.
426 Rehnquist, supra note 421, at 1169.
427 William G. Ross, When Did the “Switch in Time” Actually Occur?:  Re-discovering the
Supreme Court’s “Forgotten” Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1159 (2005).
428 Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme
Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 214 (1990).
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former Republican Senator who had fought against Louis Brandeis’s confirmation in
1916.429
They were opposed by the liberal “Three Musketeers:”  Louis Brandeis
(appointed by President Wilson in 1916), Benjamin Cardozo (appointed by
President Hoover in 1932, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals), and Harlan Stone (appointed by President Coolidge in 1925, former
Dean of Columbia Law School and United States Attorney General).430
The swing votes were Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Associate
Justice Owen Roberts.431  When Chief Justice Taft retired in 1930, President
Hoover felt obligated to offer the position to Justice Hughes, who served an
earlier stint as Associate Justice.432  An aide informed President Hoover that a
“safe” offer could be made to Hughes for the Chief position because he would
have to decline “since his son, Hoover’s Solicitor General, would resign his
post as the government’s spokesman before the Court if his father became
Chief Justice.”433  President Hoover offered the position to Justice Hughes on
the phone, and after a while, hung up and blurted:  “The son of a bitch doesn’t
give a damn about his son’s career.”434  Together, Chief Justice Hughes and
Justice Roberts were the swing votes who would hold the fate of the New Deal
legislation in their hands.  Although considered one of the more “political”
courts in history, the Justices “sternly shunned” the electoral process by
refraining from voting in national or state elections.435
On May 27, 1935 (a day later known to New Dealers as “Black Monday”),
the nation discovered how the Supreme Court would rule on the New Deal.436
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Court ruled that Congress
could not provide for mortgage relief measures, including the ability of the
debtor to discharge the note based on currently appraised value of the land
rather than on the face value of the mortgage, without providing just compensa-
tion.437  In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court held that President
Roosevelt did not have the power to remove a member of the Federal Trade
Commission simply because he disagreed with the member’s political philoso-
phy.438  And, in a unanimous decision, the Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States held that Congress lacked the power under the interstate com-
merce clause to pass the National Industrial Recovery Act.439  At a press con-
ference later that week, President Roosevelt was quoted as saying:  “We are the
only nation in the world that has not solved that problem.  We thought we were
solving it, and now it has been thrown straight in our faces and we have been





433 Id. at 214-15.
434 Id. at 215.
435 Id. at 219.
436 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 117.
437 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594, 601-02 (1935).
438 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
439 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935).
440 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 119.
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Other decisions followed.  In January 1936, the Four Horsemen, together
with Justices Roberts and Hughes, voided the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933 in United States v. Butler.441  In response, “six members of the Court
were hanged in effigy” in Iowa.442  After Butler, President Roosevelt received
a tremendous volume of mail from the public, mostly focused on the Court’s
age and its inability to grasp the plight of the American public.443  In May that
year, the Court voided legislation on the coal industry in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,444 and in June, the Court handed down Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo,445 in which the Four Horsemen, along with Justice Roberts, voided a
New York state minimum wage law for women and children.446  The Tipaldo
decision shocked even many conservatives and “ignited a firestorm of contro-
versy.”447  One regional member of the National Labor Relations Board said:
“[A]ll we want is a fair [C]ourt–not a [C]ourt remote and detached from the
conditions in the world today, a world in which the majority of the [C]ourt have
not even lived for the past twenty years.”448  A letter-writer to President
Roosevelt questioned the “‘fitness of “that body of nine old hasbeens, half-
deaf, half-blind, full-of-palsy men. . . . That they are behind the times is very
plain – all you have to do is look at Charles Hughes’ whiskers.”’”449  The New
Deal was popular with the country, and invalidating key portions of it alienated
the Court.450
At his 1937 State of the Union Address, President Roosevelt insisted that
“means must be found to adapt our legal forms and our judicial interpretation to
the actual present national needs of the largest progressive democracy in the
modern world.”451  Washington was soon awash in discussion about various
proposals, such as using constitutional amendments to expand the scope of the
Commerce Clause, requiring a two-thirds majority of the Court to invalidate
laws, and making laws passed by two-thirds of each chamber of Congress unre-
viewable.452  In “‘1935-1937, . . . saw more Court-curbing bills introduced in
Congress than in any other three-year (or thirty-five year) period in his-
tory.’”453  President Roosevelt observed that the Court interpreted the Constitu-
tion as disallowing state and federal governments from addressing the
Depression, creating a “No-Man’s Land.”454
441 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74, 78 (1936).
442 Friedman, supra note 416, at 993-94.
443 Id. at 1020.
444 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-17 (1936).
445 Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
446 Id. at 618.
447 Ross, supra note 427, at 1160.
448 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1020.
449 Id. at 1021 (quoting WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 96-97
(1995)).
450 See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup:  Public Opinion and Constitutional
Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 19 (2002).
451 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1019.
452 Rauh, supra note 428, at 215.
453 Friedman, supra note 416, at 995.
454 Id. at 994.
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C. 1936 Election
In the presidential election of 1936, President Roosevelt was re-elected by
an overwhelming majority, with his opponent winning only the electoral votes
in Maine and Vermont.455  For the first time in history, the inauguration took
place on January 20 rather than on March 4.456  The Democrats won in Con-
gress as well, with a majority of 333 to 102 in the House, and 75 to 21 in the
Senate.457  President Roosevelt, emboldened by the Democratic win, decided to
use that political capital to deal once and for all with the Court.  Waiting for
vacancies to allow him to appoint justices more inclined to uphold broad grants
of federal authority to regulate commerce proved to be too much for him, and
he decided instead on a plan that would allow him to increase the number of
justices, thus ensuring the conservatives on the Court would be outnum-
bered.458  As Attorney General Homer Cummings wrote to President
Roosevelt:  “The real difficulty is not with the Constitution, but with the Judges
who interpret it.”459
“On Friday, February 5, 1937, members of the President’s cabinet, the
Democratic leadership in both houses of Congress, and the chairmen of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees were summoned to meet . . . [at] the
White House.”460  The President explained to the assembled group that the
Supreme Court “stood as a roadblock to the progressive reforms the country
had, in the November election, overwhelmingly indicated that it wanted.”461
He then proceeded to outline a draft of a bill he wanted Congress to pass to
“reorganize” the federal judiciary.462
D. The Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937
The plan began with a statement that the federal judiciary was understaf-
fed with insufficient personnel.463
It is true that the physical facilities of conducting the business of the courts have been
greatly improved, in recent years, through the erection of suitable quarters, the provi-
sion of adequate libraries and the addition of subordinate court officers.  But in many
ways these are merely the trappings of judicial office.  They play a minor part in the
processes of justice.464
The plan then explained that of the then 237 life tenure judges, twenty-five
were over seventy years of age and eligible to leave the bench on full pay.465
To address the problem of “infirm” judges, in 1913, 1914, 1915 and 1916, “the
Attorneys General then in office recommended to the Congress that when a
455 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 119.
456 Id.
457 Ross, supra note 427, at 1160.
458 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1023.
459 Id. at 1026.
460 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 119-20.
461 Id. at 120.
462 Id.




\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ106.txt unknown Seq: 41  3-MAR-09 14:52
Fall 2008] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  A CALL FOR REFORM 119
district or a circuit judge failed to retire at the age of seventy, an additional
judge be appointed.”466  The plan then called for an increase in the number of
judges throughout the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, which
would allow the President to nominate one additional judge for every judge
over the age of seventy that did not choose to retire or resign.467  If passed, the
bill would immediately allow Roosevelt to name an additional six Justices to
the Supreme Court, for a total of fifteen Justices.
The plan “stunned” those in the room.468  Representative Hatton Sumners
of Texas, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee opposed the plan, say-
ing:  “Boys, here’s where I cash in my chips.”469  President Roosevelt, fearing
the bill would never leave the House, decided to press the bill first in the Sen-
ate.470  The Republicans, all opposed to the bill, decided to adopt a strategy of
silence, fearing that vocal opposition would dampen Democratic objections to
the bill.471
Urged by Attorney General Cummings, Roosevelt initially adopted the
strategy of justifying the bill because of workload and age issues at the
Supreme Court.472  This proved to be a key strategic mistake.  Chief Justice
Hughes, seventy-four years old, was seen every day “jauntily walking the
streets of Washington, more often twirling his cane than leaning on it.”473
Immediately following the February meeting, reaction from the public and
press was swift.  “Despite strong public frustration with the courts, something
went wrong.”474  At the White House, a change in the strategy was quickly
forming.  Justice Louis Brandeis, seen as a liberal who had upheld the New
Deal legislation, was himself the oldest justice on the bench.475  With Attorney
General Cummings on vacation in Florida, Assistant Attorney General Robert
Jackson (later to become Justice Jackson) convinced President Roosevelt that
passing the reform legislation because of the Justices’ ages was disingenuous
and created suspicions in the public mind.476
On March 9, 1937, President Roosevelt took his case for the court-packing
plan to the public.477  In one of his famous “fireside chats,” he outlined the
issue, the stakes and his solution.478  Certain portions of his speech are worth
reprinting here:
The Courts, however, have cast doubts on the ability of the elected Congress to




468 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 120.
469 Id. at 121.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 123.
472 Id. at 125.
473 Ross, supra note 427, at 1215.
474 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1028.
475 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 125.
476 Id.
477 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 9:  On “Court-Packing” (Mar. 9, 1937),
available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3309.
478 Id.
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We are at a crisis in our ability to proceed with that protection. . . .
. . . .
I want to talk with you very simply about the need for present action in this
crisis–the need to meet the unanswered challenge of one-third of a Nation ill-nour-
ished, ill-clad, ill-housed.
Last Thursday I described the American form of Government as a three horse
team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that their field might be
plowed.  The three horses are, of course, the three branches of government–the Con-
gress, the Executive and the Courts.  Two of the horses are pulling in unison today;
the third is not.  Those who have intimated that the President of the United States is
trying to drive that team, overlook the simple fact that the President, as Chief Execu-
tive, is himself one of the three horses.
It is the American people themselves who are in the driver’s seat.
It is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed.
It is the American people themselves who expect the third horse to pull in uni-
son with the other two.
. . . .
In the last four years the sound rule of giving statutes the benefit of all reasona-
ble doubt has been cast aside.  The Court has been acting not as a judicial body, but
as a policy-making body.
When the Congress has sought to stabilize national agriculture, to improve the
conditions of labor, to safeguard business against unfair competition, to protect our
national resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly national needs, the
majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass on the wisdom of these
acts of the Congress–and to approve or disapprove the public policy written into
these laws.
. . . .
The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions has improperly
set itself up as a third house of the Congress–a super-legislature, as one of the jus-
tices has called it–reading into the Constitution words and implications which are not
there, and which were never intended to be there.
. . . .
. . . . We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution–
not over it.  In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men.
. . . .
When I commenced to review the situation with the problem squarely before
me, I came by a process of elimination to the conclusion that, short of amendments,
the only method which was clearly constitutional, and would at the same time carry
out other much needed reforms, was to infuse new blood into all our Courts.  We
must have men worthy and equipped to carry out impartial justice.  But, at the same
time, we must have Judges who will bring to the Courts a present-day sense of the
Constitution–Judges who will retain in the Courts the judicial functions of a court,
and reject the legislative powers which the courts have today assumed.
. . . .
If by that phrase “packing the Court” it is charged that I wish to place on the
bench spineless puppets who would disregard the law and would decide specific
cases as I wished them to be decided, I make this answer: that no President fit for his
office would appoint, and no Senate of honorable men fit for their office would con-
firm, that kind of appointees to the Supreme Court.
But if by that phrase the charge is made that I would appoint and the Senate
would confirm Justices worthy to sit beside present members of the Court who
understand those modern conditions, that I will appoint Justices who will not under-
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take to override the judgment of the Congress on legislative policy, that I will appoint
Justices who will act as Justices and not as legislators–if the appointment of such
Justices can be called “packing the Courts,” then I say that I and with me the vast
majority of the American people favor doing just that thing–now.479
E. Committee Hearings
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings began in March 1937.480  The
administration took two weeks to call its witnesses.481  Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jackson gave a “spirited and articulate defense” of the bill based on the
idea that the Court had an outdated view of interpreting the Constitution and
was “denying the people the right to govern themselves.”482
Senator Burton Wheeler, taking the lead in opposition to the bill, decided
to attack the bill directly by attacking the initial premise President Roosevelt
had based the bill upon:  the Court’s workload.483  On March 18, 1937, Senator
Wheeler and others called upon Chief Justice Hughes and asked him to appear
as a witness to the Court’s docket.484  Chief Justice Hughes demurred, but, in
consultation with Justice Brandeis, agreed to furnish a letter to the commit-
tee.485  Chief Justice Hughes had the letter signed by Justices Brandeis and Van
Devanter, and when Senator Wheeler came to the Hughes home to pick it up,
the Chief Justice handed it to him and said, “[t]he baby is born.”486
On March 22, 1937, Senator Wheeler told the Senate Judiciary Committee
that after Attorney General Cummings testified about the Court’s inability to
keep up with its own docket, he went
to the only source in this country that could know exactly what the facts were. . . .
And I have here now a letter by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. Charles
Evan Hughes, dated March twenty-first, 1937, written by him and approved by Mr.
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Van Devanter.  Let us see what these gentlemen say
about it.487
The letter was factual and stated the Court was “fully abreast of its
work.”488  The letter continued:  “The work of passing upon these applications
for certiorari is laborious but the court is able to perform it adequately.”489
Finally, the Chief made this observation:
An increase in the number of justices of the Supreme Court, apart from any question
of policy, which I do not discuss, would not promote the efficiency of the court.  It is
believed that it would impair that efficiency so long as the court acts as a unit.  There
would be more judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more
judges to be convinced and to deride.
479 Id.
480 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 125.




485 Rauh, supra note 428, at 217.
486 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 127.
487 Id. at 127-28.
488 Letter from Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes to Senator Wheeler (Mar. 22, 1937), availa-
ble at http://newdeal.feri.org/court/hughes.htm.
489 Id.
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. . . .
. . . The present number of justices is thought to be large enough so far as the
prompt, adequate and efficient conduct of the work of the court is concerned.490
The letter had the effect of a “bombshell in the debate over the Court-
packing plan.”491  Although the letter only dealt with the first set of arguments
the administration provided for justifying the reorganization, it “necessarily
made the public suspicious of the second set.”492
F. The Switch in Time
Less than two weeks after the Hughes letter was read to the committee, on
March 29 the Court handed down West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, upholding
the minimum-wage law in Washington state.493  Two weeks after that, the
Court handed down a key case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., in
which it upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, com-
monly known as the Wagner Act.494  These decisions, together with arguments
advanced by the plan’s opponents, turned the tide of public opinion against the
plan.  The thrust of the arguments were that the Supreme Court’s ability to
defend civil rights would be compromised if the Court was too beholden to
political appointments, that the plan would undermine judicial independence,
and that the plan would give President Roosevelt dictatorial powers.495  With
Justice Van Devanter retiring a month later, the Court was finally in President
Roosevelt’s favor.496
The final nail in the coffin appeared to come when the Senate Judiciary
Committee released its report.497  The scathing report accused President
Roosevelt of punishing the Justices and described the court-packing plan as an
“invasion of judicial power such as has never before been attempted in this
country.”498  The last paragraph of the report concluded:  “It is a measure
which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be
presented to the free representatives of the free people of America.”499  “Thirty
thousand [copies of the report] were sold to the public in less than a month”
and an additional seventy thousand were sent to Congressmen for free
distribution.500
“[A]t this point, when his fortunes had sunk to their lowest, Roosevelt
brought about an astonishing recovery that breathed new life into the appar-
ently [dead] idea of Court packing.”501  On June 16, the President invited 407
“surprised” Democratic Congressmen to a picnic with him on June 25 on Jef-
490 Id.
491 REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 128.
492 Id.
493 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).
494 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
495 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1038.
496 Id. at 1028-29.
497 S. REP. NO. 75-711 (1937).
498 Id. at 11.
499 Id. at 23.
500 William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan:  A Second Life, A Second Death,
1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 675-76 (1985).
501 Id. at 677.
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ferson Island, near Annapolis.502  After a successful weekend, he sprang the
Congressmen with a surprise bill that would revive court-packing, but in com-
promised manner.  His new bill would permit him “to appoint one additional
Justice per calendar year for each member [over seventy-five years old].”503  If
passed, the bill would allow him to permit three new Justices–one for 1937,
another for 1938, and a third to replace Justice Van Devanter.504  Passage of
the bill would take a fair bit of political maneuvering, especially by President
Roosevelt’s close ally in the Senate, Joe Robinson.505  Serving as majority
leader, he extracted the votes he needed so he could inform President Roosevelt
he had the votes he needed for passage.506
In July, Washington was gripped by a heat wave, prompting one writer to
complain:
I have sweated through the Red Sea with a following wind and a sky like burnished
steel.  I have sweated through steamy tropical forests and across acrid burning
deserts, but never yet, in any equatorial hell, have I sweated as I sweated in Washing-
ton. . . The city felt as though it were dying.  There was no breeze, no air, not even
much sun.  Just a dull haze of breathless discomfort through which the noble build-
ings could be discerned, gasping like nude old gentlemen in a steam room.  The
pavement felt like grey nougat and the least exertion soaked one to the skin.507
In the midst of this heat, Senator Robinson, overweight and with a heart
condition, died in his apartment.508
“A special funeral train left Washington for Little Rock on July 17[,
1937,] carrying thirty-eight members of the Senate . . . and Vice President John
Nance Garner.”509  On the return trip, Vice President Garner spoke to most of
the Senators.510  When he returned, President Roosevelt “asked how he had
found the Court situation.”511  Garner replied, “[d]o you want it with the bark
on or off, Cap’n?”512  “Roosevelt replied: “The rough way.”513  “All right . . .
You are beat, you haven’t got the votes.”514  Roosevelt’s court-packing plan
was finally dead.515
On October 1937, Assistant Attorney General Jackson delivered a speech
in which he argued “‘[e]ither democracy must surrender to the judges or the
judges must yield to democracy.’”516  Despite Assistant Attorney General
Jackson’s prediction, democracy survived without much need for yielding of
the sort Jackson was espousing on behalf of President Roosevelt.  During his
502 Id. at 677-78.
503 Id. at 680.
504 Id.
505 Id.
506 Id. at 680-81.
507 Id. at 683 (quoting N. COWARD, PRESENT INDICATIVE 219-20 (1937)).
508 Id. at 685.





514 Id. at 132.
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516 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1000 (quoting Jackson Call Court Curb on Democracy;
Says Law Reviews Block United Functioning, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1937, at 6).
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second term, Roosevelt nominated five Justices.517  During his entire tenure,
Roosevelt appointed eight Associate Justices and one Chief Justice.518  By
1941, all but one of the Justices was a Roosevelt appointee. Life Magazine’s
1945 article on the Court was called “The Nine Young Men.”519
G. Recent Scholarship–Did the Court Cower to Save Itself?
Conventional wisdom tells the story that Justice Roberts’ change of heart,
leading him to join the liberals in upholding the Wagner Act and Washington’s
minimum wage law barely a year after he had voted the opposite, was the result
of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.  Recently, a new debate has ignited among
scholars about what really caused the Court to reverse itself and end the Loch-
ner v. New York520 era.  They agree the switch occurred, but disagree as to the
reasons why.521  Scholars agree that votes in the minimum wage case had been
cast several days before President Roosevelt’s announcement.522  Professor
Joseph Rauh concludes Justice Roberts switched not because of the court-pack-
ing plan, but because of the landslide election in 1936.523  Professor William
Ross thinks the Court’s decisions in 1936 and 1937 demonstrated an important
change in the Court’s thinking about the commerce clause and predicted the
outcome in Parrish and NLRB.524  Others have suggested the switch occurred
because of labor strife in the country, particularly the sit-down strikes, rather
than the court-packing plan.525  Professor Michael Ariens suggests that Justice
Felix Frankfurter’s role during the crisis made the difference, not Justice Rob-
erts’ switch.526
Regardless of the reasons for the Court’s switch, however, two things
appear clear from this episode of the Court’s history.  First, the American pub-
lic has little appetite for constitutional changes to the structure of American
government, even when spearheaded by an exceedingly popular President and a
meek Congress.  Second, the Court does not, and never has, operated in a vac-
uum in which contaminants unrelated to the law are immediately expunged.
The messy forces brought to bear in American representative democracy can
sometimes exert unbearable pressure on the Third Branch, in addition to the
first two, and it is precisely in those times that the Court must be at its zenith in
517 The Supreme Court Historical Society, supra note 418.
518 Friedman, supra note 416, at 1046.
519 Id.
520 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
521 See Friedman, supra note 416, at 1057. See also Alan Brinkley, The Debate Over the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005); Laura Kalman, Law,
Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2166 (1999) (providing an overview of
the debate among modern legal scholars over the explanation for the Court’s switch).
522 Laura Kalman,  The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST.
REV. 1052 (2005).
523 Rauh, supra note 428, at 217.
524 See generally Ross, supra note 427, at 1153 n.1.
525 See Drew D. Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
49 (2000).
526 Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 621
(1994). See also Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 258
(1994) (arguing that the internal “dimensions and subtleties of the Justices’ jurisprudential
postures” explains the Court’s switch).
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terms of power and its nadir in terms of partisanship.  Absent reforms, how-
ever, the judicial appointment process will continue its trend toward increased
politicization, and ultimately, the republic suffers.
VI. SUGGESTED REFORM
Some commentators have argued that judicial independence must come
with some level of judicial accountability.527  Unaccountability leads to great
frustration, which in turn feeds the symptoms described in this Article.
Accountability, however, may not be a workable solution and poses serious
constitutional problems.  Invariably, judicial accountability seeks to empiri-
cally measure, through the collection of data, judicial decision-making.  Deci-
sions would be collected, categorized, scored, statistically regressed, and sliced
and diced to demonstrate the judges’ accountability or lack thereof.  The Con-
stitution contemplates no such check or balance, nor does it clearly state if
executive or legislative branches should assume this function.  Another possi-
ble structural reform is to place limitations on judges’ recusal obligations and
authority.528  An interesting suggestion for reform, by a former federal law
clerk, is for the Supreme Court to adopt an internal rule requiring a two-thirds
majority to declare any act of Congress unconstitutional.529  Some have called
upon the bar to step up and defend the judiciary,530 both as judges and the
institution itself.531  Other commentators have suggested constitutional amend-
ments to subject Supreme Court Justices to term limits532 or retention elec-
tions.533  Professor Friedman suggests that in spite of the seriousness of the
problem, any solution is more troublesome than the problem itself.534  How-
ever, taking a few steps can help to reduce partisan attacks on judges and thus
increase judicial independence.
The most obvious of these steps is to remove the political element from
the appointment of judges.  Professor Emery Lee points out, persuasively, “that
the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for ideology to play a role in the
527 See, e.g., Posting of Robert Justin Lipkin to RATIO JURIS blog, http://rati-
ojuris.blogspot.com/2007/02/judicial-independence-v-judicial.html (Feb. 9, 2007, 13:25
EST).
528 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 643-
45 (1987).
529 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule:  Reviving Consensus and Deference
on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 1010-11 (2003).
530 See Anthony Lewis, Fifty-Second Cardozo Memorial Lecture:  Why the Courts, 22 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 133, 149 (2000).
531 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 340 (1999) (pointing out the importance of recognizing judicial independence protects
both individual judges and the judiciary).
532 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 876 (2006).
533 See Dennis B. Wilson, Electing Federal Judges and Justices:  Should the Supra-Legisla-
tors be Accountable to the Voters?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695, 737 (2006).
534 Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 737, 766 (1998). See also Barry Friedman, Attacks on Judges:  Why They
Fail, 13 ME. B.J. 124, 129 (1998) (arguing that the current system works and no reforms are
necessary).
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Senate confirmation process.”535  Professor Charles Geyh observes that the use
of impeachment, jurisdiction and court-packing are no longer viable means of
controlling courts, and that efforts to improve the appointments process have
become “increasingly viable.”536  Judges are attacked because they are seen as
political operatives.  Indeed, analyses of President Bush’s judicial appointments
reveal that for political conservatives, his “judicial appointments may be his
greatest accomplishment.”537  If judges are trusted by the American public as
truly non-partisan and unbiased, then the oxygen that feeds much (but admit-
tedly, not all) of the flames of passion in attacking judges will asphyxiate.
Many states have already learned this lesson and have adopted some variant of
the so-called “Missouri plan,” providing for nonpartisan selection of judges by
independent commissions.538
One possible model to consider is the British model, which was substan-
tially revamped in 2005.  Prior to 1993, British judges were appointed in a
purely political process.  The Home Affairs Committee described it as a
“closed system of selection by peers and supervisors which is free from scru-
tiny and largely free from challenge or redress.”539  In 1993, then Lord Chan-
cellor Lord McKay of Clashfern announced specific competitions for judicial
vacancies, including open advertising, specific job descriptions, and consulta-
tions on candidates.540  In 2001, partly as a result of a study to consider
whether safeguards against discrimination on the basis of race or sex were suf-
ficient in selection procedures for judges, the Commission for Judicial Appoint-
ments was created.541  This entity did not select judges, but instead served to
mediate for disappointed candidates and groups, and to monitor the Lord Chan-
cellor’s procedures for selection and to make improvements to the process.542
As a result of the Commission’s work and recommendations, the “tap on the
shoulder” by the Lord Chancellor, which thereto had been the exclusive method
of becoming a judge, was supplemented by a genuine application process.543
Formal feedback was provided to unsuccessful candidates, and research was
535 Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction:  Rethinking Federalist No. 76 on
the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 235, 265
(2004).
536 Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Con-
stitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 220-21
(2003).
537 Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Sara Schiavoni, Picking Judges in a
Time of Turmoil, 90 JUDICATURE 252, 283 (2007), available at http://www.als.org/ajs/
publications/Judicature_PDFs/906/Goldman_906.pdf.
538 See Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States:  Appellate and General Juris-
diction Courts (2007), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection
%20Charts.pdf.
539 Baroness Usha Prashar, Guest Lecturer, Middle Temple, Judicial Appointments:  A
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initiated to learn why women and ethnic minority lawyers were not applying
for judgeships.544
In 2003, Lord Falconer, the current Lord Chancellor, pointed out that since
the judiciary is “often involved in adjudicating on the lawfulness of the actions
of the Executive,” judicial appointments should be independent of the govern-
ment.545  This central tenet was incorporated into Britain’s Constitutional
Reform Act, which came into effect in April 2006.546
The Act is a wholesale restructuring of the judiciary in Great Britain,
including changing the role of the Lord Chancellor and creating a new Supreme
Court.547  Most relevant to this discussion, however, are provisions that affect
judicial independence and appointment.  According to the Act, all government
ministers have a statutory duty to uphold the independence of the judiciary and
not try to influence them.548  The Lord Chancellor assumes a statutory mandate
to protect judges’ independence.549  The Act demands that the only criterion for
judicial appointment is merit,550 with attention being paid to the “need to
encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for
appointments.”551
Judicial selection is now vested exclusively in the Judicial Appointments
Commission, an “independent, openly appointed and accountable body.”552
There are fifteen commissioners, including judicial, legal and non-legal profes-
sionals, all selected through open competition.553  The role of the Commission
is to select and recommend, while the Lord Chancellor appoints.554  He can
reject the recommendation, providing reasons to the Commission, but he is not
allowed to select an alternative candidate.555  In defining merit, the Judicial
Appointments Commission looks for core qualities and abilities, such as intel-
lectual capacity, integrity and independence, ability to treat others with respect
and sensitivity, authority and communication skills, and leadership and man-
agement skills.556
Britain’s experiment with judicial selection is remarkable on many levels.
First, it legislates a duty for all stakeholders in the administration of justice to
defend the independence of the judiciary.557  If a similar law were to be enacted
in the United States, it would have to be carefully crafted to permit criticism of
544 Id.
545 Id.
546 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c.4, § 3  (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2005/20050004.htm; Prashar supra note 539.
547 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c.4, § 3  (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2005/20050004.htm
548 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, supra note 546, § 3(5) (stating that the Lord Chancel-
lor and other Ministers of the Crown “must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions
through any special access to the judiciary”).
549 Id. § 3(1).
550 Id. § 63(2).
551 Id. § 64(1).






\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ106.txt unknown Seq: 50  3-MAR-09 14:52
128 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:79
the judiciary under the First Amendment while still charging politicians to
uphold the independence of the judiciary, just as they are required to uphold the
Constitution.  Presumably, such a law would give lawmakers pause before they
attacked individual judges for individual decisions made on the bench.  Second,
the British experiment turns judicial selection on its head by making the pro-
cess completely transparent and merit-based.  The experiment is too young to
be judged, but the British public have accused the Judicial Appointments Com-
mission of working too slowly, leading to many vacancies in judgeships.558
Nonetheless, having a lack of judges because a deliberative non-partisan body
is being careful in selecting judges in a transparent manner based on merit
alone may not be as bad as having a lack of judges because two political parties
are at odds as to whether a judge candidate is too liberal or too conservative.
The time has come in this country to consider wholesale reforms in our
judicial appointments process.  The lessons of Chase’s impeachment, McCar-
dle, and the court-packing plan are doomed to be lost in the hyper-partisan
environment Washington finds itself in unless the political element of judicial
appointment is reduced substantially.  While the Constitution vests judicial
appointment authority to the President with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, it is silent on the mechanics of this appointment authority.  Our republic
demands that we explore the flexibility inherent in the Constitutional appoint-
ment scheme to drive transparency and merit into this process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether the attacks on the judiciary come from impeachment, jurisdic-
tion-stripping, court-packing, or simply unbridled attacks on judicial decision-
making, they are symptomatic of a deeply held frustration born out of a sense
that, in the words of retired Justice O’Connor, the law “shouldn’t change just
because the faces on the court have changed.”559  Such frustration is to be
expected, perhaps even welcomed, in what Justice Breyer calls the “clamor” of
a representative democracy, but too often, the symptoms rise to the level of
unwarranted and unhelpful attacks when citizens lose faith in the impartiality of
the judiciary.560  When judges are seen as partisan and results-oriented, or
when judges are appointed purely because of their prior relationship with the
executive branch, confidence in the constitutional scheme suffers.  Although
charges of partisan judicial decision-making are nothing new, several important
differences have shaped American society in recent years that ensure unhappi-
ness with the judiciary’s perceived neutrality will continue.  Critically, the ris-
ing influence of grassroots organizations, mobilizing instant technology to rally
tens of thousands at once on a specific judicial nomination, will surely ensure
that the judiciary will continue to be regarded with some level of suspicion.  To
558 See Frances Gibb, Ministers are Blamed for Shortage of Judges, TIMES (London), Sept.
10, 2007, at 4. See also JAC Appoints its First High Court Judges, LAWYER, Sept. 10, 2007,
at 5.
559 FOX News Sunday: Interview with Sandra Day O’Connor (FOX television broadcast
May 20, 2007) (transcript on file with author).
560 See Ken Kersch, Justice Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 801
(2006).
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preserve the constitutional scheme and protect judges with the independence
they need to do their jobs, we should begin an earnest and honest conversation
about the manner in which federal judges are selected, beginning first and fore-
most that the selection must be made on merit and merit alone.
